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U.S. Fakes Data in Chemical War



Secret Role in Yellow Rain

Editorial

This issue is devoted almost entirely to the subject of chemical and biological warfare. Coming at a time when the attention of the world is focused at the United Nations and at demonstrations around the globe on disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, we want to be clear. The scourge of nuclear weapons undoubtedly presents the starkest threat known to the survival of humanity. But chemical and biological warfare runs a very close second, both in the vast numbers of people who can be affected indiscriminately and in the long-lasting effects on future generations and on the earth's environment. Moreover, CBW research and plans are far more secret than nuclear planning today, which is why we have given so much space to it.

CBW Plans

Chemical warfare production was subject to a moratorium imposed in 1969 by President Nixon imposed with the comforting existence of a vast stockpile of chemical weapons still stored around the nation and overseas. But as

we explain in this issue, the chemical warfare fanatics have pushed quite successfully it appears - for an end to that moratorium and the resumption of chemical munitions manufacture, this time with a more deadly generation of "binary" weapons.

Biological warfare is a crime against humanity, and the U.S. government insists it is not engaged in it. The evidence we present refutes those denials. With regard to biological warfare, Cuba has been the victim of a series of attacks from the U.S. since its revolution in 1959. The latest, the dengue epidemic of 1981, is analyzed here. We also look at some of the research still taking place in this field. As we note, while all such research is described in defensive terms, there is no practical difference between offensive and defensive biological warfare; research valuable for one is valuable for the other.

How Yellow Rain Fits In

The U.S. takes the position that it is manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons because it is against chemi-

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On the cover: U.S. troops, Luxembourg, 1980. Credit U.S. Army.

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cal weapons. They are needed, it is said, to deter others. But in justifying this deterrence argument it is necessary to argue that others are in fact using CBW. Thus arises the U.S. obsession with "yellow rain" and allegations of chemical warfare in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, all by the Soviet Union supplying its allies.

It is too convenient that the "evidence" of Soviet CBW arises just as the U.S. chemical weapons lobby moves into high gear. When Reagan's *trillion dollar* military budget is involved, anything goes. It is no coincidence that, as intelligence expert David Wise recently noted (*Los Angeles Times*, March 21, 1982), it is "widely believed" in Washington that the CIA is running covert operations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. We believe, and we hope we demonstrate in this issue, that the yellow rain story is part of those operations.

Torture and the Malvinas

Readers of *CAIB* will know that the erstwhile Argentine commander of the South Georgia Islands who surrendered to the British and dined with his captors was the "Blond Angel," Alfredo Astiz, the kidnapping and torture specialist whose photo appeared in our last issue. Astiz was taken to Britain while the Thatcher government mulled over extradition requests from both Sweden and France. Both countries alleged that their nationals had died at Astiz's bloody hands. But Mrs. Thatcher, whose conduct in Northern Ireland makes British rhetoric about Argentine butchers less than righteous, ignored the requests and Astiz was returned to Argentina. It is said that many of the commanders in the South Atlantic conflict were torturers being given a chance to polish their images, to return as war heroes.

We were shocked to read the June 7 issue of *Newsweek* magazine, which contained a column by Michael Levin, a professor of philosophy at the City College of New York, entitled "The Case for Torture." The article, calmly, rationally, and chillingly makes the argument that torture is not barbaric or impermissible, but is "morally mandatory" when it could save more lives than might be lost by its use. The piece refers solely to the torture of "terrorists," and says that "an unwillingness to dirty one's hands" is "moral cowardice."

Levin's column represents another step in the terrorism propaganda campaign—against left terrorism, to be sure, never state terrorism. There is a calculated move under way to show establishment acceptance of "any means necessary" to combat terrorism, beginning with the fables introduced by Senator Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration announced that it wishes to resume training foreign police in "counter-terrorism." This was prohibited in the early 1970s, after revelations that the Office of Public Safety of the Agency for International Development was in large part a CIA operation and to a large extent fostering police crimes, including torture, throughout the Third World.

"Mad Mike" and the Seychelles

Last issue we outlined the coup attempt in the Seychelles, led by Col. Mike Hoare, describing the various levels of U.S. and South African complicity. Hoare, facing 30 years imprisonment in his South African trial—which is taking place only because of international pressure—is singing like a canary, confirming *CAIB's* charges. He has directly implicated the South African government, testifying that they even supplied the arms for the raid, and also



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stated that the CIA was aware of the plan and supported it.

The United States is in for a tough time in the Indian Ocean. The stunning victory of the Mauritius Militant Movement complements the claims by the Seychelles of U.S. and South African interference, discussed in the last issue. Now both countries are sure to push more strongly for a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean and the removal of the U.S. base on Diego Garcia.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

As we write, President Reagan is expected to sign the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, four years after *CovertAction Information Bulletin* began, four years after the CIA started scheming to put it out of business. But as our readers know, we are not going out of business. We are confident that there is more than ever a need to expose the "invisible government."

What disturbs us is the establishment media's continual failure to recognize the real dangers of the Act. Congress and the CIA have gone to such lengths to insist that it is aimed only at *CIAIB* that the media seem to have bought the argument. We will see what happens when the next Wilson Terpil or Watergate or Scott Barnes story surfaces.

Stamp

Some readers raised their eyebrows at Ken Lawrence's article about the CIA commemorative stamp in our December 1980 issue (Number 11), doubting Lawrence's claim that the organized labor stamp was really a cover for the CIA. Now there is additional evidence of the CIA's philatelic dirty tricks. Former CIA case officer Philip Liechty told the *Washington Post* how the CIA forged a stamp of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front in 1965 and used the stamp to mail fake letters to media all

over the world. "The Vietnam Stamp" even made the cover of *Life* magazine.

Linn's Weekly Stamp News, the largest U.S. publication for collectors, questioned Liechty's allegation, but, since Americans by law are forbidden to collect Vietnamese stamps, there was nowhere in this country to go to check for evidence of printing discrepancies that are the tell-tale signs of forgery.

Lawrence stands by the allegation in his satire. He says, "If you doubt the CIA's ability to get the stamps it wants, consider this: The commemorative honoring Ramon Mag-saysay, the CIA's man in the Philippines, was issued just a few months after he died. Admirers of Martin Luther King had to wait 11 years after his death before the Postal Service honored him on a commemorative."

Conclusion

We look forward to our fifth year. Despite the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, rumors of our closing up shop are nothing more than disinformation. We have come to realize, however, that maintenance of a bi-monthly schedule is impossible, and plan more nearly to resemble a quarterly.

White Paper? Whitewash!

Philip Agee on the CIA and El Salvador

The CIA's history of document falsifications; the use of AIFLD as a CIA front; the CIA's work with paramilitary and terrorist gangs; and a line-by-line analysis of the State Department "White Paper" and the "captured" documents. The research which proved the White Paper was a fraud. Includes complete White Paper with exhibits and State Department Dissent Paper; 220 pages; paperback: \$6.50 plus \$1.50 postage and handling; hardcover: \$12.95 plus \$1.75 postage and handling.

Order from: Deep Cover Publications, P.O. Box 677, New York, NY 10013.



Grenada:

Nobody's Backyard

A sixteen mm., 60-minute color documentary celebrating the Grenadian Revolution on its first anniversary and examining the campaign of destabilization being waged against Grenada, the tiny "jewel" of the Caribbean. Includes interviews with Maurice Bishop, Cheddi Jagan, Isabel Letelier, Trevor Monroe, and Philip Agee.

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The History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers

By Ken Lawrence



* U.S. involvement with chemical and biological warfare (CBW) began in 1763 when blankets poisoned with smallpox were presented as gifts to Indians who sought only friendly relations with the colonists. It reached its peak 200 years later when the U.S. Air Force blanketed the countryside of Indochina with poisons whose effects are still being felt.

CBW did not originate in North America, of course. It dates back to the poisoned arrows and smoke screens of antiquity. But its use by the United States has been persistent, and especially savage. The genocidal use of smallpox against Native Americans begun in colonial days was repeated during the later "Trail of Tears" era of the early and middle nineteenth century.

The WWI Experience

Chemical warfare came into its own during World War One. Incapacitating and poisonous gases were employed by all the belligerent powers almost from the war's outset. Nevertheless it is significant that even though the U.S.

entered the war only in its last year, and employed far fewer weapons than the other powers, a much higher percentage of U.S. artillery was devoted to chemical weapons than was true for the others. Of gas shells fired as a proportion of total artillery ammunition, the figure for the U.S. was 12 percent, while the next highest was Germany at 6.4 percent, and the others substantially lower. The official history of the U.S. Army's Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) boasts, "By November 1918, the United States was manufacturing almost as much gas as England and France combined and nearly four times as much as Germany, which at the start of the war had led all other nations in the field of chemistry."


After the war ended, the U.S. was involved in two attempts to proscribe chemical weapons. General Pershing himself initiated a 1921 proposal that would have outlawed all use of poison gas, and it was actually ratified by the Senate, but fell through when France failed to ratify. Four years later, however, the Senate refused to ratify the Geneva Gas Protocol, and in 1926 Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg declared U.S. policy "to be fully prepared as regards chemical warfare," even though most other countries

did ratify the protocol. Meanwhile, beginning in 1922 with an appropriation of \$1,350,000, Congress gave an annual amount to the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) which gradually grew as World War Two approached.

For a time the CWS was barred from procuring and stockpiling chemical weapons (though not from research, development, and procurement planning), but in 1935 and 1936, following reports that Italy had employed poison gas during its conquest of Ethiopia, the Congress explicitly designated its appropriation for "manufacture of chemical warfare gases or other toxic substances—or other offensive or defensive materials required for gas warfare purposes."

World War II Stockpiles

Although poison gas was not used in battle during World War Two except by the Japanese against China (and possibly a few times against U.S. troops in New Guinea), both the Axis and the Allies had stockpiled large arsenals of chemical weapons, and the Germans had developed and secretly begun to manufacture two kinds of nerve gas, tabun and sarin. Both sides seriously considered employing gas and bacteriological warfare. Adolf Hitler's



1942: Walt Disney designs Micky Mouse gasmasks for children. Note picture on wall.

plans were thwarted by his commanders who feared retaliation in kind. Winston Churchill's most secret order of July 6, 1944, revealed just recently, read: "... it may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it one hundred percent. In the meanwhile, I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and not by that particular set of psalm-singing uniformed defeatists which one runs across now here now there." By this time his general staff advised against the use of gas. (Earlier Britain's Chiefs of Staff had planned to use gas against the expected Germany invasion that never transpired, and the U.S., while still officially neutral in mid-1941, secretly manufactured phosgene gas and shipped it to Britain.

Official U.S. policy was to use gas only in retaliation. On June 8, 1943 President Roosevelt told the press that "We

shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies." But secretly the option of first use remained available. Admiral Chester Nimitz and the combined Chiefs of Staff approved poison gas during the invasion of Iwo Jima, but were overruled by the President. There was also a contingency plan to use gas had the U.S. gone ahead with the plan to invade Japan, scrapped at the last minute in favor of the atom bomb. Despite the President's statement, the planners at the War Department lived with "the conviction that gas warfare was all but inevitable," according to the CWS official history.

Summing up in the recent book, *A Higher Form of Killing*, Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman wrote, "The world missed chemical warfare in the Second World War by inches." Apparently, it missed large-scale biological warfare by an even smaller margin, and in a number of instances there is strong evidence that this form of warfare probably was employed: by the Japanese against people, crops, and livestock in China; by the U.S. against crops in Germany and Japan; by the British in the assassination of Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich; and the use of infectious diseases and poison by anti-Nazi partisans in Eastern Europe.

Germ Warfare and Nuremburg

The U.S. and Britain, in 1944 or earlier, planned to attack six major German cities—Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Wilhelmshafen, and Aachen—with anthrax bombs that would have killed half their populations. The bombs were ordered produced at a factory in Vigo, Indiana, but the hazards of production delayed start-up and the war was over before the bombs could be manufactured. The British had, however, stockpiled five million cattle cakes poisoned with anthrax for use against the enemy's livestock by war's end. The U.S. went on to develop delivery systems to spread brucellosis, a highly infectious organism which is rarely fatal but incapacitates its victims with "chills and undulating fever, headache, loss of appetite, mental depression, extreme exhaustion, aching joints, and sweating," sometimes for up to a year. Virtually everyone associated with the program fell sick for a time.

Unlike chemical warfare, which had been banned by the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol that Britain had ratified and the U.S. had not, neither country considered biological warfare to be illegal, and at least one secret U.S. memo quoted by Harris and Paxman called it "very humane indeed." This later posed a problem for the Western allies: "At the end of the war, the Soviet Union pressed for the death penalty for one of the Nuremburg defendants, Hans Fritzsehe, on the grounds that he had first suggested the possibility of germ warfare to the German High Command. For Britain and America it was an acutely embarrassing moment. By 1945 they were aware that they had invested vastly more time and effort in producing these "forbidden weapons" than the Nazis. They insisted to the fury of the Russians that Fritzsehe be acquitted.

After World War II

The next reasonably well documented instance of germ warfare occurred during the Korean War. In February 1952, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China charged that U.S. pilots had

dropped "germ bombs" on North Korea. They offered as evidence the testimony of captured U.S. Air Force officers and intelligence agents, and Koreans who told of finding large quantities of fleas and other insect pests shortly after U.S. planes had flown over their areas. The U.S. government strenuously denied the charge, but a respected group of scientists believed the evidence was convincing proof that the U.S. had employed biological weapons.

"The International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China" included scientists from Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, and the Soviet Union. One of the most renowned scientists of the twentieth century, Joseph Needham of England, sat on the Commission. Its 700 page report described a whole array of germ weapons; feathers infected with anthrax; lice, fleas, and mosquitoes dosed with plague and yellow fever; diseased rodents; and various implements contaminated with deadly microbes—toilet paper, envelopes, and the ink in fountain pens.

In 1958 the Eisenhower administration pressed sedition charges against three Americans who had published the germ warfare charges in *China Monthly Review*—John W. Powell, Sylvia Powell, and Julian Schuman— but failed to get convictions.


The Vietnam War

When the bicentennial of American CBW came in the early 1960s, the U.S. government marked the occasion with the most massive chemical war waged by any power in world history. Even today the people of Indochina are suffering the long-term effects of those chemicals on their land, crops, livestock, and persons. Ironically, a large number of U.S. military personnel involved in the Indochina War have also suffered serious harm from those same chemicals, especially Agent Orange.

The use of chemical defoliants was approved by President Kennedy on November 30, 1961, following a recommendation by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the way to win a war against a guerrilla army is to destroy crops. General William C. Westmoreland also considered crop destruction an important aspect of U.S. strategy, pointing out in a secret report that spraying 13,800 acres would destroy "crops which if allowed to grow until harvest might feed 15,000 soldiers for a year."

By the end of the war, 55 million kilograms of chemical defoliants had been dropped on Indochina, mainly Agent Orange (a mixture of two herbicides plus small but toxic amounts of Dioxin, a substance considered 100 times as poisonous as cyanide), also including Agent White, especially persistent in soil, and Agent Blue, which contains arsenic and is thought to be responsible for the poisoning of many Vietnamese peasants.

Nine million kilograms of anti-personnel gases were also employed, mainly CS gas, which was used to flush enemy soldiers and civilians out of their shelters so they could be captured or shot. In closed quarters, such as caves, these so-called "riot control" chemicals can kill or maim directly, as was commonplace in Vietnam. Besides CS, there is strong evidence that, on at least three occasions, U.S. forces also used BZ gas, a hallucinogen that causes breathing difficulty, blurred vision, dizziness, disorientation, loss of memory, and erratic aggressive behavior.



Loading herbicide Agent Purple in Vietnam.

The use of chemical weapons in Indochina was more open than the germ warfare waged against North Korea, but it was still deceptive. In 1971, Major General Bernard Rogers wrote to Senator J. William Fulbright that defoliation operations in Vietnam "are of limited scope and are subject to the same regulations applied to herbicide use in the United States." General Rogers, now NATO commander, must have known this was a lie. Five million acres, 12 percent of South Vietnam, were sprayed at an application rate that averaged 13 times the amounts recommended by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Few details of this war would have become public, but for its immense scale. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted the spraying disguised as a program conducted by South Vietnamese civilians, and his Deputy Undersecretary U. Alexis Johnson proposed that "U.S. aircraft be used to conduct a 'major defoliant spray program in South Vietnam,' although the aircraft would carry South Vietnamese markings and the pilots would wear civilian clothes." The actual scope of the chemical attack against Laos, opposed even by then U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, was kept secret until this past January, and some of the details are still classified. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in a 1961 document that "care must be taken to assure that the U.S. does not become the target for charges of employing chemical or biological warfare. International repercussions could be most serious."

Although the main victims of these weapons are the people of Indochina, thousands who suffer the results of Dioxin poisoning—weakness of the eyes and some actual blindness, muscle weakness, liver damage, cancer, and a high rate of miscarriage and infant malformation, including hundreds of babies born without eyes—the harmful effects would probably have vanished from the pages of the press here were it not for the vast number of former GIs, 60,000 of them, who are suffering the same symptoms. But even their plight, which ought to serve as a monument to the horrors of CBW, is not deterring our government from embarking on its third century of germ and chemical warfare, with all the attendant lies and deceit. ●

This Side of Nuclear War:

The Pentagon's Other Option

By Louis Wolf

Part I: Yellow Rain Fabrication

Secretary of State Alexander Haig threw the full weight of the U.S. government behind an orchestrated propaganda campaign when he alleged that the Soviet Union has for the last several years been responsible for underwriting chemical warfare in Indo-China and Afghanistan, in violation of international treaties. The campaign slogan is "yellow rain" which, according to both secret and highly-publicized official "White Paper" reports and testimony before Congress, purportedly has been employed in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Where did the phrase "yellow rain" come from? To *CAIB*, its first known use in the U.S. was in an August 20, 1979 *Washington Post* article, spoken, according to the reporter Stanley Karnow, by a Laos-born English-speaking Hmong tribesman living in exile in Thailand. Two years later, in November 1981, the State Department's politico-military affairs director, Richard Burt told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, "We now have the smoking gun."

The "deadly new weapon," was called "yellow rain" according to Burt because after being dropped from aircraft over Laos, it "would make sounds, when falling on rooftops or vegetation, similar to that made by rain." Burt's account is characteristically incongruous: The overwhelming majority of houses in the country, especially in rural areas, have roofs made of thatched straw, on which even real monsoon rains make no sound that can be heard from within.

Mycotoxins are natural poisons most commonly found in mould which forms on improperly stored grains, usually at cool temperatures. They are found in many areas of the world. The symptoms of mycotoxin poisoning are varied, but usually include inflammation of the membranes of the stomach, lungs, and other organs, causing tissue deterioration and hemorrhaging.

The "Evidence"

Although there is an American Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, in a position to obtain firsthand data, nearly all "evidence" upon which the State Department depends for its Laos "yellow rain" scenario comes from interviews with Lao and Hmong refugees in Thailand. The centers, where

they live in tents and makeshift structures, are according to most reports, more like prison camps than anything else. In addition, refugees perceive, often correctly, that their chances to emigrate depend on telling visiting diplomats or journalists what they think they want to hear. Among the Hmong refugees, many of whom worked as part of the CIA's secret army in Laos during the Indochina War, this is especially so.

In addition to accounts by refugees, the State Department rests its yellow rain case on a number of very controversial samples: part of a single leaf, three quarter-inch leaf fragments, blood samples, and a small quantity of water from a stagnant pond, all allegedly from Kampuchea; and a rock scraping they say came from Laos. Out of "about 50 individual samples of greatly varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes," supposedly now in the government's hands, the Army Chemical Systems Laboratory has, according to the State Department's report to Congress in March this year, found traces of T₂ trichothecene mycotoxins in only a fraction. In fact, the State Department actually prepared chemical warfare sample collection kits and sent them to diplomatic posts in various parts of the world as part of their propaganda campaign. In November, when Burt made his "smoking gun" declaration, the entire evidence was a single allegedly contaminated leaf.

Challenges to the "Evidence"

There was, and continues to be, widespread doubt and wonder expressed about the State Department "evidence." Dr. Matthew Meselson, Harvard biologist, consultant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and world-renowned expert on chemical warfare, said that from a scientific standpoint, it is "outrageous" to expect people to accept a report of this importance based on a single sample. James R. Bamburg, the Colorado State University biochemist who first identified and named T₂ in 1969, said the "evidence" cited by Burt "is pretty shaky." Professor Douglas Lackey at Baruch College in New York asserted, "No scientist independent of the Government would consider such a specimen to constitute scientific evidence for Haig's hypothesis."

The State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon have been working on an interagency chemical warfare task force for more than five years. How did they come up with

the "smoking gun?" One "sample" was provided by Rep. Jim Leach (Rep.-Iowa), who obtained it from *Soldier of Fortune*, the magazine of mercenaries. Other "evidence" was, according to an American diplomat in Bangkok (*Washington Post*, Nov. 15, 1981), given to the U.S. Embassy (via Thai military authorities) by the Khmer Rouge rebels loyal to Pol Pot, hardly disinterested bystanders. Apparently, there was even a note from the Khmer Rouge enclosed.

The *New York Times* asked in an editorial (November 17, 1981): "What company is the [State] department keeping? With what certainty can it assure the public that its samples are genuine?" Burt assured the *Times* (Letters, November 29, 1981) that "none of the samples from the region we have analyzed have been provided by the Khmer Rouge." This, of course, contradicts the diplomat who provided the *Washington Post* with its information and who said that the Khmer Rouge had provided other samples in the past. At the same time that other officials were insisting that Khmer Rouge samples had proved positive, Burt was denying any Khmer Rouge involvement.

On September 13, 1981, Secretary Haig was speaking in West Berlin while a record 50,000 protestors marched against Reagan foreign and military policies. Inside, Haig announced, "We now have the evidence" that chemical weapons are being used in Southeast Asia. Journalists covering the next day's State Department briefing in Washington were angered and perplexed at Haig's apparent openness abroad and secrecy at home. The government refused to answer questions about exactly who had concluded that the samples contained tricothecene mycotoxins.

According to the *Wall Street Journal* (November 3, 1981) one of them is a government scientist with the CIA. Another is believed to be Sharon Watson, a microbiologist employed at Fort Detrick, according to Sterling Seagrave, author of a controversial book on yellow rain.

The government also refused to disclose the identity or agency affiliations of the nervous briefers who were there to answer questions. The new disclosures, they said, were based on a "very unique analysis method" not yet patented.

The History of "The Leaf"

Professor Chester J. Mirocha of the University of Minnesota was handpicked by the State Department last spring to analyze the first "yellow rain" samples. He was chosen, *CIA/B* has learned, because of his classified research during the Vietnam War, for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency. Supposedly to prevent Mirocha from knowing the secret and controversial nature of the research project or the government connection, the samples were sent first to a Philadelphia pharmacologist who paid for them to be spirited into his laboratory at night by someone on campus. The university administration learned about the origin of the samples only when the research was revealed in the *St. Paul Dispatch* in September.

Considering that the original single leaf was by this time rather fragile, it is surprising that the government decided to break it in half. One half was left as is, the other deliberately spiked with T₂ mycotoxins by a mysterious government scientist, and both placed in Mirocha's laboratory with a control leaf, presumably gathered from the grounds at Langley or Fort Detrick.

The glaring inconsistencies of the "evidence" are too numerous to cover completely in this article. Among them are the following:

- The 32-page State Department Report sent to Congress and the United Nations on March 22, 1982, entitled "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan," offers amazingly precise statistics. While claiming the numbers of deaths to be on the low side, an official admitted that there is "an artificial precision."

	Attacks	Deaths
Laos	261	6,504
Kampuchea	124	981
Afghanistan	47	3,042
	432	10,527

- The 32-page Report claims to consolidate most of the data accumulated by the interagency task force since 1975. In its classified form, the Report is said to be over 100 pages long. What else did it contain that it had to be cut by over two-thirds before its public release?

- One of the underlying assumptions of the State Department's case is that tricothecene mycotoxins do not grow naturally in Southeast Asia, so that they must have been artificially introduced. Colonel Frederick Celee, in the State Department Office of Theater Military Policy, on loan from the Pentagon, says that 3,000 references to tricothecenes in the scientific literature were examined and none of them reported mycotoxins being found in Southeast Asia. In fact, there have been well-known cases throughout Asia. Perhaps more appropriate is the statement by the renowned astronomer Martin Rees: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

- The State Department alleges that tricothecenes do not grow in warm climates. This overlooks the fact that while much of Indochina is climatically tropical, the upland mountainous areas of central and northern Laos, where all of the reported "yellow rain" samples were collected, are indeed quite cool. Furthermore, the November 1981 United Nations report discussed below differs sharply from the State Department view. "Mycotoxin-producing fungi are widely distributed all over the world, and in recent years with advancement in analytical methods various mycotoxins have been isolated from fungus-infected grains and other vegetable products all over the world. Although it is generally accepted that cold and humid weather is optimal for the production of most tricothecenes, various authors have demonstrated the presence of mycotoxin-producing fungi and the production of mycotoxins in rather warm climates." In particular, it appears that the tricothecenes, nivalenol, deoxynivalenol, and T₂ (all of which were said to be found by Professor Mirocha on the Laos leaf sample) are worldwide in distribution as natural contaminants. Eight scientists in India discovered several instances of natural tricothecene growth between 1976 and 1978. In 1981, researchers from the University of Maryland discovered tricothecenes at 200-300 parts per million (over four times what Mirocha found on the "yellow rain" samples) in an ordinary Brazilian shrub.

- The reliability of the "evidence" is disputed by a significant group of scientists because of the manner of its collection, transport, and storage. State Department officials claim to know nearly every detail of how the samples were collected, and say it was done with great care. How could a

Hmong tribesman the State Department says walked with leaf sample in hand for nine days until he reached the Ban Vinai refugee camp in Thailand, be expected to have kept the sample free from new contamination? Colonel Frederick Celec at State refuses to say how long other samples spent between the time they were collected and the time they reached the laboratory. When asked by *Science* magazine (October 2, 1981) if the leaf samples had signs of fungus before they were analyzed, he read from a lab report that they "were not heavily molded" but showed a "white powder resembling mold." *Science* points out that "the mold would be the most likely source of the mycotoxins." Even more troublesome is the fact that Professor Miro-

cha's laboratory engages primarily in agricultural research: while his lab might be clean to the naked eye, there is a strong possibility of independent contamination that would not arise in an ordinary scientific facility.

- The *Washington Post* (September 23, 1981) asked why the leaf sample had white mold and no yellow powder, claimed to be a silicon binder for carrying toxic chemicals. The State Department replied that some of the weapon delivery systems may not involve yellow powder at all, just toxin, which makes one wonder about all the "eyewitness" reports of "yellow rain" falling.

- In his testimony to Congress, Burt said about "yellow rain" victims: "Within an hour, they would die, apparently

Kit Green: CIA's Point Man

A -- ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR INVESTIGATION of Reported Use of Chemical Weapons (RFP 81-3). The project is to develop an improved analytical technique for use in the investigation of reports that chemical weapons (CW) have been used in violation of international legal constraints. In particular, an effort will be made to develop an accurate, reliable and practical method for analyzing biological materials to determine, weeks or months after an alleged attack, whether a person was exposed to a CW agent. The project involves the development of a detection method (immunoassay) employing antibodies to nerve agent degradation products. RFP 81-3 will be available O/A 26 Jun 81. Requests for RFP 81-3 must be in writing. Oral requests shall not be honored. It is anticipated that the date for submission of proposals will be 30 days after the date of issuance of RFP 81-3 (174).

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20451

Dr. Christopher "Kit" Green is the CIA's "point man" on yellow rain. While the State Department has had a high profile in efforts to persuade the governments of other countries to endorse U.S. allegations of chemical or biological warfare waged by the Soviet Union and its allies, the CIA has been making the same rounds in the shadows. Green was part of the 8 - member high level interagency "truth squad" that traveled for one month to ten countries, returning to Washington April 28. They visited London, Brussels, Islamabad, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo, Canberra, Wellington, and Ottawa.

Thus, while the U.S. press and public has been presented with a 32-page sanitized summary of the yellow rain evidence, a much larger classified version is being shown to officials abroad. In an unusual twist, it seems that the most dangerous security threat is posed by the American people, perhaps because some of the most skeptical responses to this campaign have come from the scientific and popular press here, while foreign governments are now considered safe repositories for U.S. secrets.

Perhaps the CIA will add a new rubber stamp to classified information, replacing the old NOFORN (no foreign dissemination) with ONLYFORN.

CAIB had assumed that the CIA was heavily involved in orchestrating the yellow rain campaign, but the main actors have been Secretary of State Alexander Haig,

Richard Burt at State's Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Dr. Robert Mikulak of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and Amoretta Hoeber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development). *CAIB* stumbled on the CIA involvement almost by accident.

The advertisement shown above appeared in the June 25, 1981 issue of *Commerce Business Daily*. With the thought that this might be an analytical technique useful to Agent Orange victims trying to document their cases, we at the *Bulletin* sent away for RFP 81-3 as soon as it came to our attention on June 28. By return mail came the following letter:

Gentlemen: [sic]

This is to notify you that RFP 81-3 for the project entitled "Analytical Methods for Investigation of Reported Use of Chemical Weapons," as circulated in the Thursday, June 25, 1981 issue of the *Commerce Business Daily*, has been canceled.

Sincerely,

Evalyn W. Dexter
Contracting Officer

Even the most credulous journalist would have smelled a rat. We wanted to know what it was that had been canceled. A Freedom of Information Act request was filed asking for the details of RFP 81-3, and eventually a couple of ACDA memoranda arrived, together with two scientific articles, one on the general principles of drug immunoassays, and one on using these techniques to prove heroin or morphine abuse.

In the cover letter, ACDA's Freedom of Information Officer Raymond O. Walters (who, by coincidence, was also the legal advisor for RFP 81-3), noted that "the 'Approve-Disapprove' lines on the (June 19) 'Action Memorandum' have not been signed" as evidence that "another branch of the government was conducting similar but more thorough studies." If this explanation is true, it is difficult to understand how a project that was

of shock and the massive loss of blood from the stomach." The man who Burt says brought the water sample from the stagnant Kampuchean pond inadvertently spilled some on his body, "and he arrived in Thailand gravely ill," with serious hemorrhaging. Chemical warfare expert Matthew Meselson says this is laughable. The State Department analysis says the water contained 66 parts per million of deoxynivalenol. Meselson estimates someone would have to drink eight gallons of such a sample to die. Chester Mirocha admits "I would have a difficult time explaining the rapid hemorrhaging." He was one of fourteen scientists whose research with pure tricothecenes on pigs showed no rapid hemorrhaging.

- It is also unexplained how T₂ tricothecenes could remain in the blood samples for weeks and in some cases months after the blood was first taken from the victim. Studies have shown that it would be scientifically improbable to find T₂ in the samples after three or four days have elapsed. Even State Department officials admit this phenomenon is "surprising."

- Different State Department spokespeople would have the world believe that in order to produce tricothecene mycotoxins requires "a major pharmaceutical facility" or "large-scale biological fermentation facilities." But, Professor James Bamburg told the *New York Times*: "You can do it in your basement or a converted dog kennel." Alex

not approved was nevertheless advertised in *Commerce Business Daily* six days later.

The most interesting document is a 10-page June 17 memorandum written by David M. Clinard of ACDA's Multilateral Affairs Bureau. He proposed a \$90,000 research project "to develop an accurate, reliable and practical method for analyzing biological materials, such as blood samples or hair, to determine weeks or months after an alleged attack, whether a person was exposed to a CW agent." In particular, he wrote, this would be useful because "recent efforts to investigate reports that chemical weapons have been used in current conflicts in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia have demonstrated that the analytical techniques presently available are seriously inadequate."

This would "mark a new direction in ACDA research in the CW field" and, "To the best of our knowledge, there are no other U.S. research efforts under way for development of immunoassay methods for investigating the use of chemical weapons." Furthermore, "this research will be of direct relevance and value to the Departments of State and Defense, as well as to the Central Intelligence Agency and other executive agencies with an interest in the arms control field . . . This proposed project has been closely coordinated with, and has the support of, other key agencies within the CW inter-agency community."

Yet, with all this close coordination, and conviction that nobody else was engaged in such research, the proposal was withdrawn within days of its publication, and immediately after *CAIB* asked for a copy, because "another branch of the government" was doing an even better job.

The memo lists the contractor selection board as consisting of Robert Mikulak as chairman, three other ACDA staffers, and "Kit Green CIA." A source told us that "another branch of government" referred to the Army's Chemical Systems Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. This was confirmed by Dr. Mikulak in an interview, but the matter of why he and other members of the interagency group had been unaware of that research remains unclear.

Another knowledgeable source identified "Kit Green" as Dr. Christopher C. Green and told us of his globetrotting on behalf of the yellow rain story. Green's name previously surfaced as one of those at Great Britain's

super-secret CBW laboratory at Porton Down involved in analyzing the apparent "umbrella assassination" of Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov. Green is in the CIA's Science Weapons Research Branch, part of the Science and Technology Division, formerly the Technical Services Division, famous as the laboratory for the Agency's assassination weapons and deadly biological potions. When we called CIA Headquarters, spokesman Dale Peterson said he had been told, as a policy decision, neither to confirm nor to deny Green's CIA employment, nor could he "make contact" with him. We reached Green by phone at his home; he did not deny that he was a member of the group touring world capitals on the "yellow rain" mission, but asked us to contact Dale Peterson to see whether he should speak further with us.

CIA involvement in this research can only raise doubts about its objectivity, particularly at a time when U.S. official policy requires "proof" of the yellow rain claims. The strange shell game history of this research proposal fortifies those doubts.

Nevertheless, the memorandum itself tends to undercut the State Department CIA's allegations, and some of its statements would be hard to find in public documents discussing yellow rain, such as this one:

"Biological samples from refugees, as well as a few physical samples, have been analyzed for evidence of exposure to chemical agents. No traces of agent or agent degradation products have been found."

Yet another statement is especially discordant since so much is being made of samples furnished by the Khmer Rouge and *Soldier of Fortune* magazine:

"CW agents in general do not persist in the environment. They are generally degraded under environmental conditions and are also rapidly metabolized by microorganisms. Thus, an agent is unlikely to be present in any sample collected more than a few days after an attack."

It seems more and more as though "yellow rain" stories are turning into the CBW version of the Gulf of Tonkin affair—the pretext for a greatly expanded U.S. CBW arsenal, and perhaps even the use of chemical or biological weapons in battle or covert operations where we will learn only too late how flimsy the case actually was.

Ciegler, a microbiologist with the Agricultural Research Service, refuted the government doctrine in the *Christian Science Monitor* (December 21, 1981): "All you need is the fungus, a few flasks, and some rice, or corn grits. You could produce it in an ordinary kitchen." University of Montana biologist E. W. Pfeiffer has had a graduate student produce mycotoxins in a small laboratory in a half hour.

- Recorded instances of fatal toxicity, both in animals and humans, have for years been connected with consumption of or exposure to moldy grain harvested in wet circumstances and then not adequately stored. Outbreaks occurred in the Soviet Union in 1942-43 from bread made with diseased grain, during 1965-66 in the U.S., Canada, and Belgium from contaminated beer, and in 1968 in Wisconsin from consumption of moldy corn by cattle. In Japan in 1970, mycotoxins were found in horse feed, and in Scotland in 1977 in dairy cattle feed from moldy brewer's grain.

- State Department references to T₂ tricothecene mycotoxins as "rare" puzzled chemists and biologists. Not only is T₂ common everywhere, but also it is for sale widely on the open market in the U.S.; the Sigma Chemical Company in St. Louis sells it and four other toxins in a \$75 kit. A number of other commercial laboratories in the United States and one in Israel routinely manufacture T₂ toxins. Even the Food and Drug Administration in Washington maintained stocks of it for some time.

- Another major deficiency in the "proof" of yellow rain use is the absence of scarred victims. Persons who have survived a bout with mycotoxins, in the words of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (January 15, 1982), "would be expected to have some tissue scarring and nerve and skin problems, the latter in the form of blisters." Yet, after five years of propaganda, intensive propaganda of late, not a single person has been found or produced with such scarring.

U.N. Studies Yellow Rain Question

In December 1980, the United Nations General Assembly determined to start an impartial investigation on the reports of chemical warfare. The group "found itself unable to reach a final conclusion as to whether or not chemical warfare agents had been used" and, among the 28 refugees interviewed in Thailand, did not "detect signs and symptoms which would be suggestive of exposure to chemical warfare agents. Almost from its inception, and particularly after its 56-page report was issued in November 1981, the team was the victim of undue pressures and some crude disinformation. They received 199 written submissions from the U.S. government about alleged "yellow rain" incidents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. When the sheer number of submissions didn't sway the group, insinuations were leaked to the press that it had a built-in anti-U.S. bias. The composition of the body, appointed by then Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, reveals the hollowness of that rumor. The chairman, Maj. Gen. Dr. Esmat Ezz, is scientific research head in the Egyptian armed forces. The other members are: Dr. Edward Ambeva, an orthopedic surgeon in Mombasa, Kenya; Lt. Col. Nestor Castillo, from the ordnance and chemical branch of the Philippine armed forces; and Humberto Guerra, a professor of microbiology and tropical medicine in Lima, Peru. The group scientific consultant is Professor Herbert

Marcovich of the Pasteur Institute in Paris, France.

Laos and Kampuchea

Fred Swartzendruber and his wife worked in Laos from October 1979 to May 1981, representing the Mennonite Central Committee in its humanitarian efforts there. He testified about "yellow rain" twice recently before congressional committees. His work required extensive travel in rural Laos, in both Hmong and ethnic Lao areas, and having heard much about yellow rain in Bangkok, he constantly asked the Hmong he met about the alleged attacks. Swartzendruber didn't find one Hmong who even knew of a single attack.

Two doctors with Hmong and Lao refugees in Thailand had the same story. Dr. Charles Weldon, a longtime U.S. Agency for International Development employee, who worked in Laos from 1963-67, told the visiting United Nations investigation team that in his five months as the longest-serving medical director at the Nong Khai Refugee Holding Center, he had had no experience with alleged victims of chemical attack. Dr. Gideon Regalado, medical officer at the Ban Vinai Refugee Holding Center since February 1980, told the U.N. team there is no way to confirm the refugees' allegations about "yellow rain" attacks on them. "No set of signs and symptoms were suggestive of abnormalities associated with chemical warfare agents," he said.

There is continuing evidence that the United States, together with the People's Republic of China and, most recently, Thailand, have decided to give full support, covert and overt, to Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea" forces, despite the international image of Pol Pot as a mass butcher of his people. The allegations of "yellow rain" in Kampuchea have since 1978 been featured on the clandestine radio and in the press releases of Pol Pot from his sanctuary in Thailand. The March 1982 State Department "Special Report" suggests that prior to early 1980, there were "a minimum" of 4,606 deaths in Laos and 284 in Kampuchea stemming from chemical attacks. Yet in 1980 a Thai military spokesman was quoted by the *Bangkok World* (March 8) saying "so far we have not heard of any deaths." It is also worth noting that in a Reuters report (Baltimore *Sun*, Sept. 17, 1981), Gen. Dien Del, the leader of another anti-communist rebel group, said his forces had never been attacked by chemical weapons. Their base is in northwest Kampuchea, where the State Department in fact claimed that 124 attacks took place. The old Khmer proverb "One cannot hide a dead elephant under a basket" seems to describe the situation best.

Thailand's Involvement

Military and chemical-biological collaboration between the U.S. and Thailand is long-standing. The Thai Army Chemical Branch was created with substantial financial assistance and training from various parts of the Pentagon including Fort Detrick; at least 19 Thai military officers received chemical and biological training in the United States between 1953-69. The Thai government provided Fort Detrick with two sites at the Pran Buri Defoliation Test Area during 1964-66 for field trials of the assorted chemicals used in Vietnam and, at the same time, signed secret agreements establishing U.S. air bases in the country. It was at that time that the air war in Vietnam and Laos

escalated, and these bases were critical to the entire operation.

Since November 1981, according to Associated Press and the Bangkok newspaper *The Nation* (December 26, 1981), aircraft of the U.S. Seventh Fleet have once again been granted use of the strategic Utapao Air Force Base, located 70 miles northeast of Bangkok, for landing and refueling needs as part of the U.S.-Thailand Joint Training Program. AP quoted U.S. Ambassador John Gunther Dean as saying in Honolulu in April 1982 that the United States wants to reopen its former bases in Thailand for unspecified uses in Southeast Asia; the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok claimed the AP story was inaccurate. Some reports suggest that as part of a common military strategy, directed at all three countries of Indochina, the U.S. is reestablishing Thailand as its primary operations staging area for the region. The precise role which the Thai chemical corps is performing for Washington vis a vis "yellow rain" is a matter still under investigation. *CAIB* has also learned that U.S.-Thai training of Hmong Lao resistance pilots has begun at Udorn Air Base.

Afghanistan

Some months ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger suggested the U.S. possessed "very good evidence" that the Soviet Union was employing chemical weapons in Afghanistan. Asked for the evidence by journalists, the *New York Times* (March 14, 1982) reported, "a Pentagon aide checked high and low, then conceded 'I've got nothing.'" Then, in March, the State Department's latest report depicted widespread chemical attacks by the Afghan government, with Soviet support and equipment, against anti-government elements. The report refers to no actual evidence of chemical warfare agents or the metal canisters referred to in the text. "The government sometimes seems to exaggerate the prevalence of symptoms to support its conclusions," the *Christian Science Monitor* observed (December, 21, 1981). A State Department officer had told the *Monitor* reporter that he would provide documentation showing widespread mycotoxin symptoms among the alleged Afghan victims. "But the material he presented," the reporter writes, "showed scarcely anything related to the specific mycotoxin symptoms." The *London Times*

correspondent in New Delhi had yet another account. "Hospitals on the border [with Afghanistan], where many sick and wounded Afghans are treated, report no evidence of injury such as burns or damage to the respiratory system caused by chemical weapons. . . . During 12 days of travel with a guerrilla column in Afghanistan this year [1981], I heard no complaint of the Russians using chemical weapons. . . . Western journalists have interviewed hundreds of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and exiles in India without hearing any reliable reports of chemical attacks."

In sum the extremely tenuous nature of the U.S. government's heady propaganda about "yellow rain" was put in a nutshell by then Under Secretary of State Matthew Nimetz: "We are not in a position either to confirm or disprove conclusively reports of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where the U.S. government has no presence." (*Washington Post*, April 25, 1980)

This has not deterred them.

Part II: U.S. CBW Arsenal

It was 5:23 in the morning of May 14th when a sleepy Senate approved a mammoth \$177.9 billion military budget. The marathon 20-hour session, forced on the body by Armed Services Committee chairman John Tower (Rep.-Texas) and Senate majority leader Howard Baker, Jr. (Dem.-Tennessee), was marked by yawning senators anxious to go home. Canvas cots were set up in the corridors outside the chamber for those unable to stay awake. The voted budget is but a part of the actual anticipated Pentagon expenditure. President Reagan has requested a full \$263 billion for the first installment of the gargantuan \$1.6 trillion he is seeking for the military between now and 1987, and Pentagon watchers expect Congress will probably give him \$260 billion this time around.

The U.S. chemical warfare program got a substantial boost that morning. There was a lengthy, emotional debate, and Vice President George Bush was called from his bed to the floor in the event his vote was required to break a tie. At about 3:15 a.m., with all but six senators present, a rollcall vote was taken on the amendment of Senator Gary Hart (Dem.-Colorado) aimed at stopping the buildup. When the 49-45 tally against the amendment was announced, the Pentagon's long-planned program to resume production of chemical weapons for the first time since 1969 when they were officially renounced by President Nixon, had the Senate's green light. The House of Representatives is considered a pushover for the proposed plan.

History of CBW Research

This development follows more than three decades of government experimentation in chemical and biological warfare (CBW), added to by data and equipment captured at the war's end from the Germans and Japanese. Biological weapons and warfare are defined by the U.S. Army as "the use of microorganisms ('germs'), such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsiae, and substances (toxins) derived

Flash Frozen

The "Periscope" column of the April 19, 1982 *Newsweek* sounds as though the CIA is taking its new chemical warfare propaganda from old Captain Video and Buck Rogers scripts.

Following the recitation of "still more evidence" of chemical attacks in Afghanistan, the item says, "Most chilling of all, American intelligence has learned of a new substance nicknamed 'silent killer' that causes victims to die as if flash frozen, sometimes with guns still in hand."

They forgot to add the line about sending two boxtops and twenty-five cents to get your own silent killer gun. If they keep printing stuff like this, *Newsweek* may put the *National Enquirer* out of business.

from living organisms (as distinguished from synthetic chemicals used as gases or poisons) to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or plants."

In 1949, an enclosed one-million liter test sphere-- the world's largest--was built at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, and creation of explosive biological warfare munitions containing disease causing organisms was begun. On December 21, 1951, Secretary of Defense Robert Frost issued an order to all Pentagon sections that CBW "readiness" be expanded. By 1953, the BW research and development facilities at rechristened Fort Detrick were upgraded, and construction of the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas was completed at a cost of \$90 million. Within the Arsenal's first 18 months, *Brucella suis* (a biological agent causing undulant fever) and the lethal *Pasteurella tularensis* (causing tularemia) were produced on a large scale.

In 1956 a secret policy stipulated that the United States "would be prepared to use BW or CW in a general war to enhance military effectiveness." This policy was purportedly in reaction to statements of Soviet leaders. In December 1958 a Defense Science Board symposium at Rand Corporation offices recommended further increase in CBW research, establishing "weapons systems use doctrines," and launching a campaign to "gain public acceptance and support" for such weapons.

Another installation, the Deseret Test Center, at Fort Douglas, Utah was established in 1962. Between then and 1969 (a year after it merged with the Dugway Proving Ground), it sponsored a joint research effort by the Smithsonian Institution and the University of Oklahoma conducted in sites outside the U.S. chosen by the government for open-air biological tests. The declared objective of the effort was to assess potential reservoirs of certain infectious agents, and possible paths by which they could be disseminated. Between 1963-69, studies under Deseret auspices were carried out in the central Pacific Ocean (approximately from the Hawaiian Islands west to Guam and south to Samoa); in Alaska, near the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea; and at unspecified locations off the Pacific coast of the U.S. This program sought to determine the relative distribution of birds and mammals, to study their feeding and breeding behavior and migratory routes, and to "ascertain the breeding and host preferences of mosquitoes and biting flies."

The Role of the CIA

The CIA was deeply involved in many of the tests, both in planning and implementation. The so-called Special Operations Division of the U.S. Army Biological Laboratories at Fort Detrick collaborated with and was in large part staffed by CIA officers, especially through the 1960s. They maintained and experimented with a sizable stockpile of bacteriological agents and toxins. [See the CIA document opposite, reproduced from the 1975 Senate report of the Church Committee, "Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents."] The CIA also carried out a long series of secret open-air tests using many different biological agents. The New York City subway tunnels, the Washington, D.C. bus terminal, water-supply systems in a number of cities and towns, and even the drinking fountains at the Pentagon were targeted by the Agency's Technical Services Division operatives with what they euphemistically called "innocuous organisms." Also, for many years, in the CIA's now-

famous MKULTRA mind-control program, yet unknown numbers of unwitting citizens, including students, prisoners, and mental patients were subjected to injections of or exposures to a whole range of mind-bending drugs.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Continuity Plan for the Office of Biological Warfare Agents

1. On 10 November 1969, President Nixon ordered the Department of Defense to recommend plans for the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. (On 14 February 1970, he included all toxin weapons.)

2. On 15 January 1970, the Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick, Maryland prepared a requested inventory, lists toxins, and submitted it to the Scientific Director, Fort Detrick. This inventory was a requested input to assist the Commanding Officer, Ft. Detrick to prepare a comprehensive plan for demilitarization on site of all biological agents/units which are stockpiled in support of operational plans.

3. Under an established agreement with the Department of the Army, the CIA has a limited quantity of biological agents and toxins stored and maintained by the SO Division at Ft. Detrick. This stockpile did not appear on the inventory list. The agents and toxins are:

Agents:

1. *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax) - 1.5 grams
2. *Pasteurella tularensis* (tularemia) - 1 gram
3. Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis virus (encephalitis) - 20 grams
4. *Coccidioides immitis* (Valley fever) - 20 grams
5. *Brucella suis* (brucellosis) - 1 to 3 grams
6. *Brucella melitensis* (brucellosis) - 2 to 3 grams

RE FROM:

FIG 14 1975

CIA

7. *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* (tuberculosis) - 5 grams
8. *Salmonella typhimurium* (food poisoning) - 10 grams
9. *Salmonella typhimurium* (chlorine resistant) (food poisoning) - 3 grams
10. Variola Virus (smallpox) - 20 grams

Toxins:

1. *Escherichia coli* enterotoxin (food poisoning) - 10 grams
2. *Clostridium botulinum* Type A (lethal food poisoning) - 5 grams
3. Paralytic Shellfish Poison - 5.193 grams
4. *Dangerous Candidia Venom* (Krait) (lethal snake venom) - 2 grams
5. *Microcystis aeruginosa* toxin (intestinal flu) 25 mg
6. Toxiferine (paralytic effect) - 100 mg

This stockpile capability plus some research effort in delivery systems is funded at \$75,000 per annum.

4. In the event the decision is made by the Department of Defense to dispose of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons, it is possible that the CIA's stockpile, even though in R&D quantities and unlisted, will be destroyed.

5. If the Director wishes to continue this special capability, it is recommended that if the above DOD decision is made, the existing agency stockpile at SO Division, Ft. Detrick be transferred to the Huntington Research Center, Becton-Dickinson Company, Baltimore, Maryland. Arrangements have been made for this contingency and assurances have been given by the potential contractor to store and maintain the agency's stockpile at a cost no greater than \$74,000 per annum.

TSD: wjc (16 February 1970)

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
1 - D TSD
1 - C TSD/CB

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

A CIA inventory of its biological weapons, included in the 1975 Church Committee report.


In the most famous case to date, Dr. Frank Olson, who had worked for the military in biological warfare since 1943, was served a glass of Cointreau on November 19, 1953. The CIA's TSD chief and the godfather of its CBW efforts, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, had spiked the liqueur with LSD. Eight days later, Olson ran headlong through the window of the New York City hotel room where the CIA had him under guard and fell ten floors to his death. For more than two decades, the Olson family was lied to by the CIA, who told them that Frank Olson had committed suicide, until the Rockefeller Commission reported in 1975 that a man had died after being administered LSD in a CIA experiment. Only after the family went public did the government finally step forward. President Ford apologized personally, and in 1976, Frank Olson's widow and three children were awarded \$750,000 as "compensation."

In another much publicized case, James Thornwell, a Black GI, was unknowingly subjected to repeated LSD "treatments" by the Army in France in 1961. According to one Army document during Thornwell's detention as a supposed suspect in the theft of certain classified documents (a phony charge of which he was later completely exonerated), his captors threatened "to extend the state indefinitely, even to a permanent state of insanity." The Army's Operation THIRD CHANCE had also victimized at least nine other people, all non-U.S. nationals, apparently with the assistance of the French police. Thornwell sued the U.S. because he has known nothing but severe headaches and dizziness ever since, rendering him totally unemployable. In 1981, after an agonizing 20 years, legislation passed in Congress and signed by President Carter awarded Thornwell approximately the same "compensation" as Olson.

The Work at Fort Detrick

In mid-1972, the United States and 94 other nations signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (which does not include chemical weapons). That year Fort Detrick was transferred administratively from the U.S. Army Materiel Command to the Office of the Surgeon General within the Department of the Army and made part of the National Cancer Institute, while some of the biological research facilities were moved to nearby Edgewood Arsenal; a substantial part of the research at Detrick and Edgewood has remained secret. In 1976, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), still located at Fort Detrick, conducted a large range of biological testing according to official government reports. Predictably, the Army defends the research as necessary to prepare for the possible use of such diseases or weapons against U.S. military forces. But Dr. Jonathan King, a professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology pointed out at the January 1982 American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting that "the actual process is the same as developing the strain to consider its possible employment as a weapon." Using human "volunteers," primarily prisoners, mental patients, and members of the armed forces, the following studies were conducted at USAMRIID in 1976:

- Clinical evaluation of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever vaccine (12 "volunteers")
- Acceptability study of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis vaccine (6)
- Tests with Influenza virus vaccines (174)
- Tests of western equine encephalomyelitis (6)



Credit: U.S. Army

Fort Detrick, for years the nerve center of U.S. biological warfare development.

- Immunization of Fort Detrick laboratory workers with Monovalent (Swine) influenza (174)

The staff budget at USAMRIID tripled in the five years since its transfer; staff numbered about 460 by 1977. A Pentagon spokesman said in 1980 that the facility would investigate "those diseases which plague mankind," the very diseases that Fort Detrick was investigating in its biological warfare programs.

In the annual Department of Defense report on chemical warfare and biological research programs which Congress requires by law, the Army said that during Fiscal Year 1979, as part of a \$16.1 million biological research program, studies were performed on "some of the most virulent and pathogenic microorganisms known," ostensibly to develop vaccines. They included viruses causing Lassa fever, Congo/Crimean hemorrhagic fever, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Argentinian hemorrhagic fever, Korean hemorrhagic fever, Ebola fever, Rift Valley fever, Legionnaire's disease, Q fever, anthrax, and botulism, among others.

The CIA and the Army joined forces in other chemical

warfare endeavors, including operations DORK, MKNAOMI, and OFTEN/CHICKWIT, whose main objective was experimentation with and perfection of incapacitating, hallucinatory psychochemicals, most of which were classified as rejects by various pharmaceutical companies because of the unknown or undesirable side effects connected with the substances. There are now safeguards and protocols regarding the use of human subjects, but, as one Detrick officer stated candidly: "Anything can happen in experiments of this kind."

In interviews with *CAIB*, officials at Fort Detrick assert that the research now is done "almost invariably" for one of the major pharmaceutical firms. Such names as Sandoz, Honeywell, Inc., Dow Chemical Co., and Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., among others, were the government's partners in the program. *Mother Jones* magazine (May 1982) cites a May 8, 1971 CIA memorandum indicating that the Agency's Office of Research and Development and the Army's Chemical Corps joined in the development of offensive incapacitants; more than 26,000 different drugs had been put together "for future screening."

Research, Development and Human Guinea Pigs

In order to conduct chemical and biological warfare, someone has to develop and test the weapons. In his 1968 book, *Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal*, Seymour M. Hersh wrote that of the 52 colleges and universities then known to be recipients of Pentagon CBW contracts (Hersh stressed even then that this list was far from complete), "almost without exception the universities once queried denied they were conducting such research." This is a dirty business, and the respected researchers and institutions who engage in it for the government understand that as well as anybody.

Since Hersh wrote his book, a great deal more has been learned about who conducts this research, how they do it, and, the most shameful of all the secrets they have tried to deny, how they test the products on unwitting human subjects. In all of this work, the military services and the intelligence agencies have managed to coordinate their tasks quite well, while continuing to keep their academic benchmen in tow.

The Known Programs

The best documented program of human experimentation is the series of CIA and military mind control drug programs *BEUBIRD*, *ART:CHOKE*, *CHATTER*, and the culmination of them all, *MKULTRA* and *MKNAOMI*. These have been extensively described in the 1975 and 1976 hearings and reports of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee), *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate* by John Marks, and in dozens of other books and articles. The most dramatic result of these tests was the suicide of Frank Olson, an unwitting subject.

While the CIA was trying to develop mind control weapons for small scale use in clandestine operations, the military wanted to employ these same substances in large scale warfare. One of the Army's victims, James Thornwell, was given LSD with the threat that the hallucinogenic state could be extended "indefinitely, even to a permanent condition of insanity" if he failed to comply with their wishes.

Following these disclosures, other similar programs came to light:

- In 1950 the U.S. Army released turkey feathers infected with cereal rust spores over a crop of oats, and concluded this method can "carry sufficient numbers of spores to initiate a cereal rust epidemic." (This experiment, kept secret until 1979, tends to support the charges

of U.S. germ warfare against Korea two years later.)

- On September 26, 1950, the U.S. Navy sprayed a cloud of bacteria on the city of San Francisco. Although the Navy claimed the bacillus used in the simulated attack, *Serratia marcescens*, was harmless, many residents came down with pneumonia-like symptoms and one, Edward Nevin, died.

- Fourteen tests were conducted in Winnipeg, Manitoba, between July and September 1953, in which clouds of zinc cadmium sulfide were sprayed throughout the city to simulate chemical and biological weapons dispersal patterns. Similar experiments were carried out in St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Fort Wayne, Indiana, beginning in 1952.

- On July 29, 1953, a Navy jet sprayed a zinc cadmium sulfide cloud over the Monocacy River Valley in Maryland and Leesburg, Virginia. Though this chemical was initially thought to be harmless, one military report mentioned respiratory problems, and a Canadian pharmacologist, concerned about the Winnipeg test, claims it could be dangerous to babies, elderly people, and asthma patients.

- In early 1955 the Tampa Bay area experienced a sharp rise in whooping cough cases, including 12 deaths, following a CIA biological warfare test in the area whose details are still secret, but include bacteria withdrawn from Fort Detrick.

- In 1964 the Army's *PROJECT DORK* subjected eight enlisted "volunteers" to open air gas attacks using the hallucinogenic BZ to test both the effectiveness of the substance itself and its antidote, "treatment of Z-induced delirium with eserine [physostigmine]."

- From June 7 to 10, 1966 the Army's Special Operations Division dispensed a bacillus *Subtilis* *Pa. Niger* throughout the New York City subway system. The Army's report on the experiment noted the existence of subways in the Soviet Union, Europe, and South America. In an earlier test from February 11 to 15, a specially equipped car disseminated another simulated toxic cloud in tunnels and highways in the New York City area. The Pennsylvania Turnpike was another target.

- From July 9 to 31, 1966, the Army dropped 22 tons of tiny glass beads and fluorescent cork particles over a 4,800 square mile area of Texas between Corpus Christi and Freeport in a simulated chemical and biological attack.

- Between June 1, 1968 and June 1, 1969 the CIA experimented with the possibility of poisoning drinking water systems by injecting a chemical substance into the water supply of the Food and Drug

One of these, a psychotropic called quinelidiny benzi-late or BZ, was first purchased by the Army's Edgewood Arsenal in 1961 from Hollman-LaRoche, and very soon it had accumulated a \$10 million stockpile of some 50 tons, enough to incapacitate every human being on the face of the earth. Secret experiments were conducted on thousands of American soldiers and prisoners. One CIA report reveals that a related compound called "EA-3167," described as a lethal incapacitant, created "prolonged psychotic effects" in some of the unsuspecting human guinea pigs who managed to survive. In many cases, BZ caused human subjects to become "maniacal."

On April 7, 1982 the government announced its intention to build a facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal to destroy some 1,500 BZ bombs over the next 12 years. The Army takes the position that BZ is now obsolete, though the CIA may not agree. Documents obtained by journalists under the Freedom of Information Act suggest that CIA researchers lean toward the use of BZ and similar materials as weapons of law enforcement and "limited war," for possible use at home and abroad. The official willingness to destroy the

BZ stocks may be explained by what a *Mother Jones* source suggests is an administration plan to spend some \$10 million on the development of a new family of modern incapacitants.

Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Seymour Hersh estimated in his 1968 landmark book, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal," that annually as many as 60,000 hamsters, rats, mice, rabbits, guinea pigs, sheep and monkeys were being used and presumably sacrificed in Fort Detrick laboratories. At one point, Detrick was the world's largest user of guinea pigs.

Part III: Binaries: The "Clean" Killers

Harvard biochemist Dr. Matthew Meselson summed up his assessment of the new Reagan CW production scheme in testimony May 5 before the Senate Committee on Appropriations: "I believe that the underlying assumptions of

Administration building in Washington.

- Between August 1 and November 24, 1969, the Army sprayed zinc cadmium sulfide over a swampy forest on the Eastern Shore of Maryland 115 times. This site was chosen to simulate a "tropical jungle," to learn the difference between CBW in such an area and in cities or open grasslands.

- During a Congressional investigation in 1977, the Army admitted that of the hundreds of open air experiments using what were thought to be harmless agents, 25 of the tests targeted the public. In addition, on 48 occasions between 1951 and 1967 the Army employed microbes known to be disease causing agents in open air tests, and it used disease causing antitrop substances 31 times.

During those same years, three workers at Fort Detrick died from contact with germ warfare agents, two from anthrax and one from encephalitis, and 465 became infected but survived. About 50 got sick from working with these agents at other facilities.

The History of Tests

Tests of this sort go back at least to World War II if not earlier. All 26 property owners on Horn Island, Mississippi, in the Gulf of Mexico, were evicted from their land in 1942 by the Army's Chemical Warfare Service, which then conducted CBW tests only 12 miles from the Biloxi coast.

Since last October there has been considerable press coverage of the biological weapons tests conducted by Japan on Chinese, Soviet, and U.S. prisoners of war during World War II, as a result of an article in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* last fall. The scandal isn't just that the Japanese conducted grisly human experiments, but that the U.S. chose to keep those activities secret, and to employ and to learn from those who ran them, so as to enhance the U.S. CBW arsenal.

Actually this is old news. All the details had been reported by Radio Moscow in late December of 1949, including the fact that American POWs had been used as guinea pigs and that the war criminals who had conducted the program were being protected by the U.S. government. That report was dismissed as cold war propaganda, and was even ignored when Saburo Ienaga, a professor at Tokyo University, published the same story in 1968, in his history of the Pacific War. But when U.S. government documents that confirmed the earlier accounts were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Robert Gomer, John W. Powell, and Bert V.A. Roling, the story could no longer be suppressed. (This is the same John W. Powell who was prosecuted for publishing details of U.S. germ warfare in Korea.)

Recent Incidents

Are the CIA and the Army still engaged in CBW research and testing? Most likely so, although proof isn't as easy to provide as in the documented cases from the forties, fifties, and sixties. But suspicious circumstances abound. In 1976, British scientists speculated that

mysterious outbreak of "Legionnaire's Disease" might have been due to an artificial variant of Lassa fever developed by the germ warfare facility at Fort Detrick. That same year the Humane Society of Utah wanted to know why 50 wild horses had died mysteriously after drinking from a spring near the U.S. Army's Dugway Proving Ground, another center of germ warfare research.

In June of 1976, a bottle of a chemical used in germ warfare, orthochlorobenzylidene-melonyl, mysteriously appeared in an empty lot in Houston, Texas, and when a tractor ran over it 80 people were treated and 20 had to be hospitalized. R.K. Stevenson, father of the tractor driver, described what happened to his son: "Gary was on a tractor mowing the lot and the tractor broke this little jar. There was this yellowish powder and dust and within seconds Gary's nose started burning and his face began to swell. He said he couldn't breathe. I tried to help him and then I got this burning sensation on my face and nose too. It felt like 100 bees had stung me." No one knew where the chemical had come from.

If this incident had happened during the age of Reagan and Haig, it is likely one of them would have charged the U.S.S.R. with waging a "yellow rain" attack on Houston. As things actually happened, the victims suspected the source was much closer to home.

Other suspicious cases include the research into Rift Valley fever conducted on Plum Island in Long Island Sound. Tight security procedures carried out there by the U.S. Department of Agriculture seemed so mysterious to local residents in 1978 that they clamored for an explanation, and the one they were given by Dr. Jerry J. Callis, director of the center, did not satisfy them. And the outbreak of Q fever at the Army's Letterman research institute in San Francisco may mean more than meets the eye. [See *CATB* Number 16.]

It is certain that sources of germ warfare material are in easy reach of the military and the intelligence agencies. Deadly smallpox virus is stored at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, for example, and a number of research facilities are producing recombinant DNA, including the National Institutes of Health.

But the strongest recent evidence is from Pakistan. The government of that country is certainly not hostile to the United States; it is even engaged in joint covert military actions with the U.S. and China against Afghanistan. Yet last February Pakistan expelled Dr. David R. Nalin, the American head of a malaria research center near Lahore after charges were made by members of his senior Pakistani staff that the laboratory was a breeding center for disease-bearing mosquitoes to be used against Cuba and Afghanistan, and that unwitting Pakistanis had been used as guinea pigs.

Naturally the U.S. government has denied the charge. One can only wonder whether this is another case like the story of U.S. protection given to Japanese germ warfare criminals, denied when it was published but confirmed by declassified U.S. documents 33 years later, that will be a major scandal of the future.

**Department of Defense Report on Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Program
Obligations, October 1, 1980-September 30, 1981**

	Army	Marine Corps	Air Force	TOTAL
Chemical Warfare Program	\$132,184,000	\$21,866,000	\$32,184,000	\$186,234,000
RDT & E	\$ 70,682,000	\$21,866,000	\$ 8,500,000	\$101,048,000
Procurement	61,502,000		23,684,000	\$ 85,186,000
Biological Research Program	15,096,000			15,096,000
RDT & E	15,096,000			15,096,000
Ordnance Program	23,847,000			23,847,000
RDT & E	7,546,000			7,546,000
Procurement	16,301,000			16,301,000
TOTAL PROGRAM	171,127,000	21,866,000	31,184,000	225,177,000
RDT & E	93,324,000	21,866,000	8,500,000	123,690,000
Procurement	77,803,000		23,684,000	101,487,000

RDT & E = Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

the Administration's chemical weapons program are highly questionable. I believe they are based on wholly inadequate analyses of the characteristics of chemical weapons. I believe that this lack of adequate analysis and coherent planning seriously risks disastrous consequences to the United States and its allies should we become involved in chemical war."

Professor Julian Perry Robinson, a senior fellow in the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University in the U.K., and another authority on the issue, told the senators that Europeans "see no manifestation of a United States commitment to chemical warfare arms control. We see what looks very much like American duplicity on this score."

Senator Gary Hart said the Reagan proposals to reproduce a new generation of lethal chemical weapons are "unnecessary," "dangerous to our own troops," "unreliable" because field tests have not been conducted, and could "precipitate a major crisis" within NATO.

Binary Nerve Gas Weapons

What is it that has set off such deep and widespread opposition? A former Pentagon official quoted by Seymour Hersh said: "The Chemical Corps is a cult... always overselling everything." It is their unrelenting zeal for offensive rather than defensive chemical hardware, and their power even within the Pentagon that fuel the debate over the Reagan decision to build a \$370 million factory at Pine Bluff Arsenal to manufacture binary nerve gas weapons. Binaries are made by taking two separate liquid chemicals and placing them in a bomb-shaped canister with two compartments. The two ingredients supposedly would only mix during a 15,000 rpm spin in flight after the bomb is either launched on the ground as mortar or artillery, or dropped from a plane. One version uses methylphosphonic difluoride or DF and isopropanol or IP, which mix to form the lethal gas GB. The other version uses ethyl 2-(diisopropylamino) ethylmethylphosphonite or QL and dimethylpolysulfide or NM, which mix to form the gas VX. Sarin or GB nerve gas is a highly volatile, short-lived gas meant to be used as a vapor and inhaled by victims. A minuscule amount means at least a 50% certainty of death through paralysis of the nervous system. VX gas is used in a persistent spray form that would linger, and kill through

contact, for days or weeks. In most cases, humans die from exposure to only .4 milligram of it.

Death from all the nerve gases, both for people and animals, is horrible. The gases dim the vision, burn and perforate the skin, make the bronchial tubes constrict and fill with thick mucous, cause muscular paralysis, generate uncontrollable diarrhea, vomiting, and intense sweating, disrupt the red blood cells, attack the central nervous system, set off violent convulsions, and block the respiratory system causing asphyxiation—sometimes in minutes, sometimes in hours. A less than lethal dose creates lifelong neurologic and psychiatric abnormalities.

Research on binary nerve gas weapons started in 1949 and began seriously at Edgewood Arsenal in 1954, but was kept entirely secret until 1967 when patents for binaries were made public. It is often suggested that the reason for the CBW buildup of the 1970s was chemical defensive equipment found in Soviet tanks captured from the Egyptians in the 1973 Middle East War—an explanation cited, for example, in the June 5, 1975 *New York Times*. The problem with this explanation is that the War broke out on October 6, 1973, and it was on September 18, 1973 that Army Secretary Howard "Bo" Calloway announced the plan to expand Pine Bluff Arsenal and build chemical weapons there.

In the view of Dr. Saul Hormats, who was until 1973 director of development at the Army Chemical Systems Laboratory and one of the architects of existing U.S. chemical warfare capabilities, "The proposed binary munitions are not a simple change from other rounds, but are an entirely new design. Their functioning will be entirely different from their predecessors." There is much which is either completely unknown, or which the military is not being entirely honest about with Congress and the public.

The Dangers of the Components

Theodore S. Gold, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Chemical Matters, in his May 6 testimony before Congress, called the binary chemicals "relatively nontoxic." Other advocates call them "safer" than chemicals now in place. Yet, no one ventures to call them "harmless."

According to the British authority Julian Perry Robinson, in his 1975 study on binary weapons for the Stock-

Department of the Army Research During 1980-81 and Future Plans [Excerpts]

- Initiated studies to determine the chemical effects of nerve agents on the skin;
- Determined that "the paralysis of breathing caused by a specific nerve agent is due to the effect of the nerve agent on the respiratory regulatory center of the brain;"
- Learned that "long-term brain dysfunctions associated with nerve agent exposure are probably due to paralysis of breathing and oxygen starvation of the brain;"
- Intensified interface with university and chemical communities;
- Planned to continue inhalation exposures of animals to determine the toxicological, carcinogenic, reproduction, behavioral and physiologic effects;
- Created an Action Group under the Technical Cooperation Program and a Special Working Party under the Quadripartite Working Group. These coordinate different aspects of modeling and data bases between the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. A model to "assess the total effects of chemical warfare" was completed.
- Contracted for a study to investigate the psychological impact of chemical warfare;
- Conducted new riot control agent FA-4923 evaluative studies; two filters were made;
- Ordered expanded research on anthrax. The number of scientists and laboratory space for the purpose was increased.

holm International Peace Research Institute, "DF is poisonous and very unpleasant to handle; only Chemical Corps people, used to the extreme hazards of nerve gas, could describe it as 'harmless' or 'relatively non-toxic.'" A technical report by Edgewood Arsenal tells that DF is "extremely pungent and irritating to the eyes and mucous membranes, much like hydrogen fluoride." Professor Robinson compares DF to chlorine gas in toxicity, and other scientific sources suggest it is as poisonous as strychnine.

The Pentagon claims DF is only equally toxic as CS riot-control tear gas, officially classed as non-lethal. But CS can kill a person hit by it directly or at close range, and it is particularly toxic inside houses or closed areas. It is also worth noting that the October 1981 "Defense Demilitarization Manual" states that tear gases are classified by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as "toxicological agents."

Gordon Burek, in his 1980 study on CW for the private Washington-based Center for Defense Information, notes, "Q1 reacts violently with water and oxygen and cannot be stored in rubber or any plastic except Teflon." Professor Robinson agrees with a government report which says Q1 tends to decompose in storage. This characteristic may also be present in DF; the Army contracted in September 1980 with Battelle Laboratories in Ohio to study whether DF could corrode through the inner wall of artillery shells slated for use in the binary program. It would seem that the Army is not so confident as it appears. The advantages of the binary which its proponents proclaim so assuredly over the current stockpile of unitary munitions are that binaries are, as stated in the Defense Science Board's 1980 Summer Study Panel report, "the most sensible means available to establish safety, security, transportability, deployment, use, and [future] demilitarization."

The Pentagon claims that it takes only two or three minutes for an infantry soldier to assemble binary munitions. What do military commanders think? *Chemical & Engineering News* (Dec. 15, 1980) speaks of how many military officers have "a deep and abiding abhorrence of chemical weapons [which they] view as too unpredictable and capricious." The idea of a combat soldier struggling with a potentially lethal chemical bomb as bullets fly past or as planes strafe his position would make anyone think twice about the real value of the binary. At any moment, the wind direction can change and the deadly chemical come wafting back to its source.

One of the binary's best features, the Army claimed to various congressional committees, is lighter weight as

compared with the unitary 105mm and 155mm munitions. They said its shipping weight will be 60 pounds when completed, or 40% less than the unitary weapon. However, when queried by *Army Times* reporter Neil Roland (April 12, 1982), the Army adjusted the weight upward to 107 pounds or 6% more than the unitary stocks.

The Known Weapons

The three weapons known to make up the binary package are: (1) the 6.1-inch M687 155mm GB nerve gas artillery projectile, (2) the B1.U-80 B "Bigeye" VX nerve gas bomb with an expected reach of 300 or more miles (to be completed by the Navy in Fiscal Year 1984), and (3) an 8-inch VX artillery projectile. This is just the beginning. An extremely knowledgeable congressional source told C&EB: "I have a gut feeling that they, the Pentagon, are planning for, or working toward the future option of using most, even all of the major weapons systems for deploying their chemical munitions."

Although this trio is to be deployed by 1987, the director of the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate at the Pentagon, Major General Niles J. Fulwyler and other Defense officials have said on occasion that the actual timetable allows for ten to 15 years. Some of the other weapons the generals are planning to have as part of their chemical inventory, if Congress cooperates, are: the Multiple Launch Rocket System warhead module now being built by the U.S. and, in the future by Germany, the United Kingdom and France; a binary warhead for an Army-proposed medium range tactical missile; a warhead for the Ground Launched Cruise missile; the Lance missile; the Pershing II missile; air-to-ground rockets; unmanned aircraft; assorted ground-based artillery and mortar weapons; and land mines.

C&EB has also learned that the antipersonnel "flechette" and "cluster bombs" used by the U.S. in Viet Nam are now among the lengthening list of candidates for the new binary weapon family. This would be in direct contravention of the 1907 Hague Convention, which prohibits use in war of poisoned projectiles. In some of these cases, it is difficult to conceive how it would be possible to accomplish a binary construction and application. Peter Pringle in *Defense Week* (Feb. 22, 1982) suggests: "All these weapons probably will contain a new nerve agent codenamed FA-5774. This is known as an 'intermediate agent' which means that it is capable of simultaneously attacking the lungs, like GB, and the skin, like VX."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1982

Dear Mr. President:


As you know, the avoidance of chemical warfare has been a stated goal of the civilized world throughout the century. The United States, in support of this goal, is committed to the policy of "no first use" of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons and to the objective of banning such weapons.

Considering the current world situation, particularly the absence of a verifiable ban on producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, the United States must also deter chemical warfare by denying a significant military advantage to any possible initiator. Such a deterrence requires modernization of our retaliatory capability, as well as improvement of our chemical warfare protective measures. We also believe this step will provide strong leverage towards negotiating a verifiable agreement banning chemical weapons. I therefore certify, in accordance with section 818 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976 (50 U.S.C. 1519), that the production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest.

A full report supporting this certification is being provided by the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510



Reagan's chemical warfare marching orders.

The Costs

Actual planned expenditures are secret, but from public sources and close analysis of the known costs for various weapons systems and developments it is possible to do some educated guesswork. The *New York Times* (Sept. 17, 1980) and the *Christian Science Monitor* (Oct. 16, 1980) suggested the cost might be \$4 billion. One of the program's most vocal opponents, Senator David Pryor, estimated the first stage of the program to be "at least \$6 billion" (*New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1982). Theodore Gold, since March 1982 the top Pentagon official responsible for the chemical warfare program, testified at the May 6 Senate hearing that they "anticipate expenditures of \$6-7 billion between now and 1987. The *Los Angeles Times* may have been the first major U.S. media to recognize at least the more likely proportion of the costs involved; it said that "well over \$50 billion in spending... could be involved." In a background study for the Congressional Research Service (April 1, 1982), Elias M. Kallis wrote that "early and tentative estimates indicate an average of \$130-150 million a year for ten to 15 years."

However, if we examine chemical warfare and biological research expenditures reported by the Pentagon during the year ending September 30, 1981 (see table), tabulated before the major binary construction was even begun, the Kallis figure looks considerably on the low side. Given the appetite of the Chemical Corps, the inevitable cost overruns, rising inflation that is particularly high in military-related research and development, and anticipated cross-overs of the chemical weapons into other systems that are budgeted separately, an approximate outlay of \$18-23 billion over the next 10 to 15 years seems entirely possible.

In this context, it is ludicrous that on May 15, just 36 hours after the Senate had voted \$705 million for the binaries, Gary Crocker of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, one of the frontliners in the "yellow rain" offensive, told a scientific gathering at Princeton University: "None of us are out to get money for chemical warfare. We are hoping to get rid of chemical weapons."

Deterioration

In addition to the questionable "safety" of binaries, another Pentagon justification for the buildup is supposed deterioration and leakage in the huge existing stockpile of unitary lethal chemical weapons. Details are secret but estimated available chemicals comprise 37,000-40,000 tons of mustard, GB, and VX gases, and 150,000-200,000 tons of munitions. If additional chemicals now in bulk form were put into munitions, experts believe the overall weight would be in the 400,000 ton range.

Officially, the materiel is stored at eight areas in the U.S. (on installations in Oregon, Colorado, Utah, Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky, Indiana, and Maryland), two in West Germany, and one on Johnston Island in the Pacific 750 miles south of Hawaii. Unofficially, Okinawa is yet another storage site. Although 13,000 tons of nerve gas munitions were shipped from Okinawa to Johnston Island in 1971 after widespread protests in Okinawa and Japan, some reports suggest the U.S. covertly keeps CW agents on military installations on Okinawa.

The military is uncharacteristically candid in claiming that CW stocks are deteriorating, though they fail to mention that many stocks were cannibalized for use in Vietnam. The General Accounting Office suggested in a 1977



Part of the deadly VX nerve gas stockpile.

survey that there may be another explanation: "Using anticipated approval of the binary program as a reason for not maintaining the stockpile is inconsistent with sound management." The intense desire of the Chemical Corps for the binary program might also explain the wide discrepancies in Army statements. Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (Rep.-Arkansas) told his colleagues (*Congressional Record*, Sept. 10, 1980) that he had just been told by the Army in a secret briefing that there were 730,000 defective, deteriorated, or obsolete chemical rounds. Six months later a Pentagon spokesman told UPI that the figure then was 120,000, "including 960 rounds that leak." More recently, the Army told *Army Times* (April 19, 1982) "about 1,200" have been found leaking. In his May 5, 1982 testimony, Matthew Meselson reported that the Army has still more recently checked all its stored 155mm, 8-inch, and mustard gas munitions, and graded them "Condition Code A," which the Army defines thus: "Serviceable - fully meets all military characteristics. Issuable without limit or restriction." Meselson added that as of last summer, there were but 33 chemical projectiles certified by the Army as "leakers." Even Senator Jake Garn (Rep.-Utah), a close Pentagon ally, challenged military accounts of leakage during the May 5 hearings. Garn, of course, is touting the "safety" of CBW in general. His military opponents want the newer and "better" and immensely costly binaries.

The GAO said it appeared that the Army had done all it could to assure the gradual deterioration of the stockpiles. Their "serviceability may have been greatly understated. For example, many of the unserviceable classifications are a result of minor nonfunctional defects, such as container rust, which do not affect usability . . . [and] entire production lots are classified unserviceable for a few defects." GAO inspectors told the Army it should "stop disposing of usable stocks." The Department of Defense "generally agreed" with the findings, if not with all of the report's recommendations. To this day, much of the stockpile is reportedly stored out in the open, fully exposed to the sun and rain. Problems like this contribute to what one knowledgeable Washington source told *CAIB* is a deep distrust felt among professionals at the Pentagon toward the Chemical Corps. The Navy is especially opposed to the proposed plan.

As if the military were testing their own idiocy level, the Defense Nuclear Agency contracted for a \$100,000 study with a La Jolla, California company, S-Cubed, to research the technical feasibility of detonating a nuclear device at an underground CW storage area to demilitarize "obsolete" unitary chemical munitions. Some of the questions the study will attempt to answer, according to Col. John Spence, commander of the Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency, include: "Will munitions be driven into the periphery, for instance, and overground? Will a nuclear detonation cause complex, unexpected technological changes?"

Testing

Many experts question the feasibility of the binary program because neither the munitions nor the chemical compounds that will comprise them have been fully tested. There is a great deal of public concern over the prospect of open-air testing, a contingency the military officially does

not foresee, saying it does not need such tests. But many Americans have not forgotten March 13, 1968, when 6,400 sheep were killed in Skull Valley, 85 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah, by poison gas that unpredicted winds carried from an open-air test being conducted at Dugway



Proving Ground, an installation 25% larger than Rhode Island. Soon after the accident, Congress passed a law requiring prior congressional assent to any open-air testing; there has been no such approach to Congress thus far.

Despite the Army's official position on the issue, the Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer spoke at the U.S. Naval Academy on October 21, 1980 and, according to an Army transcript, he called for "public support" of open-air testing. However, the Army changed its tune 18 months later when it distributed another transcript with Meyer's statement completely absent.

The importance of human testing to the military is underlined by a September 1981 report by the "U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Ad Hoc Committee on Potential New Methods of Detection and Identification of Chemical Warfare Agents." It recommends the use of human guinea pigs to test new CW weapons. Senator Mark Hatfield read a brief extract from the classified report on



the Senate floor during the all-night debate May 14. "The political and emotional issues associated with using live agents on human subjects are recognized as difficult, but, nevertheless, their use is critical to acquiring key information regarding the effects of nerve agents on the ability to complete operational missions."

Deployment

Apart from the effects of binary nerve gases, perhaps the most sensitive issue is that of their deployment, both in and outside the United States. The Reagan chemical blueprint has precipitated tremendous controversy overseas. A newspaper in Paris warned: "Beware Europeans, you will be the first victims of a chemical conflict." Some countries in Western Europe, including West Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Italy, are signatories to treaties barring production, use and, in some cases, storage of chemical weapons on their soil. West Germany has been openly uneasy about permitting the U.S. to keep stockpiling CW munitions there. On April 22 this year, the anniversary of the first use of gas in World War I, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party passed a resolution that must have sent shock waves through the halls of the Pentagon, asking Bonn to "remove all stockpiles of poison gas and give no permission for future deployment of such warfare agents . . ." The Dutch government rejected both storage and use of the weapons only a week after the U.S. CW development plan was announced, and Norway followed suit shortly thereafter.


Before the election of Mitterand, France (which has a substantial stockpile of its own and apparently continues CW research) was evidently considered by the Pentagon for some binary storage and, authoritative sources believe, field testing. But new French government policy, if any, is still awaited. *Chemical & Engineering News* reporter Lois Ember spoke to a French military attache in Washington [May 31, 1982] and was told that the two countries are at present sharing technical data on chemical weapons, including binaries. The attache also confirmed that joint field testing of binaries is possible "if the political climate between the U.S. and France remains favorable." The DoD's Theodore Gold denied the French attache's claims of such bilateral collaboration.

Other nations with chemical arsenals of various proportions include Canada, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, China, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and South Africa. None of these is a likely binary storage site. Recent reported uses of chemical or biological weapons included that by China during its February 1979 invasion of Vietnam, that by South Africa against Angola in December 1981, and incidents occurring in El Salvador in the first months of 1982.

There is a long history of close technical collaboration in the chemical and biological weapons field between Washington and London, more particularly between Edgewood Arsenal and Fort Detrick on the one hand and Porton Down and Nancekuke on the other. Because of this and strategic and geographic considerations, the United Kingdom ranks highest on the Pentagon's overseas binary weapons deployment wish list. There were ruffled feathers on both sides of the ocean after an article by Reuter (see *Baltimore Sun*, December 30, 1981) quoting Amoretta Hoeber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, as saying that the senior-level Defense Science Board "preferred" deployment of binaries in the U.K. The Pentagon issued a swift, albeit soft statement formally denying the story. However, a Pentagon official who refused to be identified by name told the Reuter correspondent, Chris Hanson, "I wouldn't call it a denial. The key is that the document is classified."

Questioned about it by *CAIB*, the Pentagon now claims that Hanson misquoted Hoeber, who for a number of years has been an outspoken advocate of binaries and of chemical rearmament. Hanson stands by his story, and told *CAIB* that he had checked Hoeber's comments with her during three successive interviews. The Hoeber interview caused great consternation to U.S. officials. *CAIB* has learned from reliable sources that upon hearing the story, at about 3:00 a.m. on December 30th, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger telephoned Secretary of the Army John Marsh, Jr. and irately ordered Hoeber's immediate dismissal. Cooler heads prevailed however and Hoeber still holds the position.

British defense minister John Nott issued his own quasi-denial. He said Washington had not approached him and that he did not expect an approach to be made. Many in the



U.K. believe that despite the official denials and diplomatic sidestepping, there is a secret agreement between the two powers either under negotiation or else already signed. Indeed, there were bilateral discussions about possible U.S. deployment there in the middle 1970s during the James Callaghan administration, but they faltered. Then, almost immediately after Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, the discussions began anew. In the summer of 1980, according to the important new book, "A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ Warfare" by Jeremy Paxman and Robert Harris, senior military people from both nations held a number of joint meetings. Then, in December 1980, the defense minister spoke out publicly in favor of chemical weaponry readiness.

In the case of chemical weapons deployment, the U.S. has appeared reluctant to seek the views of other governments, considering U.S. interests paramount. A recent colloquy in Congress illustrates this. The 1981 Senate Appropriations conference committee supplemental report directed the Administration "to determine the long-range costs of the chemical warfare modernization program and provide a country-by-country report from our NATO allies [15 countries] with respect to their official views on the long-range program." In the May 6, 1982 hearing before the Committee, the chairman, Senator Mark Hatfield (Rep.-Oregon) pressed two government witnesses, Richard Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy, and Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs.

Wagner: "We, of course, have understood that we are faced with a dilemma in trying to comply with your desires and the language in the bill to be responsive to you in that way. We have talked among ourselves, clearly, and with the Department of State at length as to whether or not we could and should provide for you that rather detailed country-by-country statement or assessment. We felt that it was not, frankly, sir, in the interest of the alliance . . . We have queried and informed the allies about our current development and production program . . . I understand we have not been as responsive as you would like us to be, sir."

Chairman Hatfield: What alternative to forward deployment do you have, or options, if the European allies are ruled out?

Wagner: The option is to keep the weapons in this country and to deploy them to Europe in time of war when we begin to see that they are needed . . . that is certainly where they would end up.

Burt: If and when this Administration is ready to make a decision on deployment, we have told the allies that we will consult closely with them.

Hatfield: In effect what you are saying is you have not complied with the request as stated in the language as to determining country-by-country the view of our allies on our chemical weapons program.

Burt: As I said before, we do not know their views . . . We have not offered their views.

Hatfield: Even though, as Mr. Wagner says, these weapons would have to be deployed to be effective in the European theater.

Burt: We would never deploy the weapons in the European theater without consulting with our allies.

Hatfield: Of course not. That is not my question. My question is again, these are weapons that would be manufactured and would not be effective in some kind of a depot here or arsenal but would be a weapon utilized in a forward deployment or advanced deployment in a time of need.

Wagner: We believe, Senator Hatfield, that the purpose of the weapons is deterrence.

Hatfield: That is still not my question. My question is simply that these weapons, unlike many other weapons, to be effective, are required to be placed in an advanced deployed position, which would be in Europe.

Wagner: Just before they are used, they must certainly be there where they must be used.

Hatfield: I understand. We have not yet determined what the opinion of our allies is, not on the question of deployment, but on the question of

Richard Burt: Chemical War Propagandist

The key role of Richard R. Burt in the "yellow rain" propaganda blitz stems from his going to bat for the chemical warfare lobby several years ago. In February 1977, while a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, he was a paid consultant to the Stanford Research Institute in its Pentagon-sponsored two-volume treatise, "Evaluation of Chemical Warfare Policy Alternatives 1980-1990." His 23-page paper, "Deterrence and the Alliance: What Role for Chemical Weapons?" leaves little doubt as to where he comes down on this issue.

He observes correctly that "the pressures to reexamine and perhaps restructure NATO capabilities below the nuclear threshold are growing," and that "Europeans might prefer to lose a conventional war than lose a chemical one." Then he goes on, "Alliance theatre nuclear posture is . . . inextricably tied to NATO doctrine for chemical weapons, and the adequacy of a no-first-use chemical strategy is directly proportional to the credibility of an Alliance strategy that does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons." Telling the Pentagon precisely what it wants to hear, he asserts "chemical weapons possess the political attributes of both conventional and nuclear weapons . . ."

After the obligatory justification of chemical weapons as a deterrent to their use by the Soviet Union, he boasts about "the emergence of a new generation of chemical weapons in the West and a new class of precision-guided systems with which to deliver them. . . ." He sets out "long-range CW options—aircraft, ballistic or cruise missiles" and calls ominously for "a series of destructive options, ranging from short-term incapacitants to lethal area agents."

For a 35-year-old non-military theoretician, this is pretty big stuff. It is consistent however with his three-year stint at the *New York Times* (1978-81). Holding Carter, the State Department spokesman under President Carter, once observed that when you read Richard Burt in the *New York Times*, you see Zbigniew Brzezinski's lips moving. However, Burt's best friends and most frequent inside sources for his headline stories were at the Pentagon. He was seen by many high-level people at the Carter State Department as "a Xerox machine for the military."

cranking up this program again after Mr. Nixon's moratorium which has been superseded by this new action.

Burt: Mr. Chairman, we simply don't see the need or the necessity to do that at present.

Hatfield: That is perhaps correct. But that was not what the language of the report was. So you are still not in compliance with the language of the report, because you cannot tell me what the opinion of the allies is country-by-country.

Burt: That is right. Since it is a totally hypothetical issue, they have not told us and we have not asked.

Hatfield: I see. Thank you very much.

On the subject of deployment, so easily brushed aside by these witnesses, Matthew Meselson was more realistic in his May 5 testimony. He said that if the U.S. became engaged in chemical warfare in Europe and decided to deploy the munitions it would need to use, it would require six weeks and 6,300 flights by the entire U.S. fleet of 230 C-141E Air Force cargo planes commuting from Delaware to West Germany and back.

Conclusion

The State Department and the Pentagon both defend the new chemical rearmament program by saying the U.S. is negotiating in good faith for a ban on CW production and stockpiling, but that the Soviet Union has failed to reciprocate. Professor Julian Perry Robinson suggests that the U.S., especially during the Reagan administration, has exhibited a drastically different working governmental policy. He cites Washington's unwillingness to resume bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R., last held in 1980, and the American abstention and no vote in the United Nations General Assembly on two resolutions that sought the continuation of chemical warfare negotiations. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed in a July 1980 report to the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva that they will both comply on an international ban *after initial chemical stocks and production facilities are destroyed*. But this is no simple task. In a May 12, 1982 letter to Senator Dale Bumpers (Rep.-Arkansas), Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Wagner said the DoD will dispose of "unserviceable" chemical munitions at a rate of only approximately 100 agent tons annually. The Senate vote two days later stipulated that for every binary weapon constructed under the new program, one of the unitary munitions shall be demilitarized. At the Pentagon's pace, this will take 35 years or more.

Anti-binary Senator Mark Hatfield observed during the all-night budget debate: "Either this administration and the Armed Services Committee is fully prepared with its eyes open to pursue a strategy which it knows will result in slaughter of the innocent on a scale that bears no reasonable relationship to the end in view; or it has no strategy at all . . . I must say that it is consistent with the preponderance of military decisions we have seen . . . Perhaps we should appropriate more money. Perhaps we should instruct the Department of Defense to design a gas mask for European infants and for elderly people. They will be the ones who will bear the brunt of this policy. Or perhaps we should be telling the Europeans to begin to prepare evacuation plans."

How many casualties would there be in the event chemical weapons were used? Matthew Meselson calculates, and other experts agree, that under ordinary weather conditions in Europe, within an area between two and 20 square kilometers of the impact point everyone without protective equipment would perish. This is based upon a low estimate of munitions used; if the higher figure relied on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1980 Senate testimony is used, between 16 and 40 square kilometers would be turned into a lethal zone. This would cause four to 40 million deaths, depending on whether major cities were involved.

In chemical war you kill approximately 20 civilians for every soldier, though the Pentagon, State Department and congressional proponents of chemical war preparations generally ignore or cover up this unpopular fact. In a September 4, 1980 Armed Services Committee hearing on chemical warfare, Senator Carl Levin (Dem.-Michigan) asked former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown how many civilian and military deaths could be expected; the answer in the printed transcript was deleted.

The Congressional Research Service reported recently that there are 647,526 United States government military and civilian personnel and their dependents now in Western and Southern Europe. Theodore Gold, responsible for chemical warfare matters at the Pentagon, admits that while the government has an evacuation plan, it does not include protective gear such as soldiers would be supplied. Charles Thomas, director of the State Department's Office of Security and Political Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs, told the Senators on May 6: ". . . the question of protecting civilians, not just American civilians, but also European civilians, is not addressed in any fashion. The fact that the U.S. troops will be fully protected doesn't help the Europeans." Dr. Matthew Meselson estimates that a major chemical conflict in Europe could result in "tens of millions of civilian casualties."



DoD's Nerve Gas Sales Pitch

How does the Pentagon convince Congress and the American people that, after a decade, the country must start renewed production of highly unpopular chemical weapons? It's called the "Army Chemical Action Plan," or ACAP.

The ACAP sales method was exposed recently (see *Defense Week*, March 1; *Army Times*, April 19; and *The Press*, April 1982). ACAP stems from a 1977 Department of Defense Consolidated Guidance, a Carter-era policy directing the military to exert more research and training efforts on chemical warfare. Since the early 1970s, the Chemical Corps generals had been pressing for a binary construction program. The Guidance gave them new impetus, and they were undaunted by resistance from Congress and even from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Then, when Ronald Reagan was elected, they received signals from the transition team that they would get their way soon enough. The Army Nuclear and Chemical Directorate began in earnest to formulate a strategy for getting the money and the go-ahead from Congress, and by June 1981, they won approval for ACAP from the Chief of Staff, Gen. Edward C. Meyer.

The 15-part ACAP plan has "targeted" the sectors of American society that it considers central to molding a "positive public CW awareness." The targets are key opinion-makers in Congress, the media, the scientific community, academia, and industry. The plan also refers to "key senior executives and staffers (within the White House) and critical federal departments and agencies whose support and understanding of CW national security needs are essential." ACAP was and still is the game plan for U.S. chemical warfare planners. As Lt. Col. Pete Bolton of the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate told *C&IB*, ACAP is "a roadmap to where we're going."

Even though most of the plan is unclassified, the Army says it is "an internal Army management document" and refuses to release it to the public. They insist it is still classified "Secret." The quotations here were given unofficially to journalists on a non-attributable basis.

C&IB has obtained a copy of another Army document, a child of ACAP. Falling under the Army's program title, "Speaking With One Voice" and dated March 19, 1982, it gives Army public affairs officers the prescribed language for replies to queries from the public about chemical warfare, the binary development effort, and the human effects of these weapons. One section, entitled "Chemical Warfare (Morality)", answers the hypothetical question, "Why do you want to produce these immoral weapons?" without discussing morality. The official answer given is that the U.S. "does not want to produce chemical weapons; we want to deter their use. . . ."

Military contractors always have substantial relations with the Pentagon. During much of the last decade, in the absence of CW production, this relationship with

CW companies has not been much in evidence. However, many technical briefings for these industries started up again, particularly since 1979. Recently, CW contractors have been hosted by the Army at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate is based. In April, a 4-day symposium on "Mission Accomplishment in a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Environment" was convened by the Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; many of the same industrial contractors were there to present "state-of-the-art" papers.

There are periodic statements, especially in recent months, that the U.S. will not use chemical weapons first, that they are only being developed now for "retaliatory" purposes. However, in a letter dated May 19, 1981 to Senator Sam Nunn (Dem.-Georgia), Secretary Weinberger lobbied for "reacquiring a credible offensive chemical capability." [Emphasis added.] Not only are the binaries seen by the Pentagon brass as potentially offensive; *C&IB* has also learned there is a top-secret study that was done recently on the Rapid Deployment Force and the potential use of chemical warfare as a first-strike weapon.

There is a related, even more sophisticated, area of research which according to several independent sources has military potential. "Ethnic warfare" is inquiry into the development of chemical or biological weapons having ethnic or racial specificity. In 1969, a Pentagon spokesman told Congress: "The dramatic progress being made in the field of molecular biology led us to investigate the relevance of this field of science to biological warfare." A human geneticist at the University of Lund in Sweden, Carl A. Larson, wrote an article titled "Ethnic Weapons" in *Military Review* (November 1970), the journal of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He cites indications that children in certain non-European ethnic groups (mentioning Filipinos, Thais, Indians, Chinese, and some African populations) experience a high rate of intolerance to lactose or milk sugar, due to extra-normal enzyme deficiencies. In this connection, he refers to "poison-provoking enzyme production."

While research in the sensitive and controversial field of human engineering is kept highly secret, if for no other reason than that it constitutes a clear violation of international treaties to which the United States is a signatory, there is at least one published reference confirming further that the Pentagon has had more than a passing interest in it. Two U.S. Army Biological Laboratory researchers wrote a report in 1970 discussing chemical manipulation of deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] in research on a biological warfare agent in the *Pasteurella* family. It is not known whether these kinds of investigations continue; it seems unlikely that the Pentagon would abandon earlier efforts that could lead to the perfection of such a weapon.



**The Technology
of Destruction**

Vietnam: Air Force C-123s lay down a carpet of toxic herbicides



Jackfruit orchard northern Quang Tri province, killed in 1967 by herbicides. Photo taken 1973.



Credit: U.S. Army

U.S. Biological Warfare:

The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic

By Bill Schaap

For more than 20 years Cuba has been the victim of American attacks, overt and covert, large and small, unremitting. Ships and buildings have been bombed; cane fields have been burned; invasions have been launched; and planes have been blown out of the sky. But many of the attacks have been even less conventional. Cuba has seen its share of chemical and biological warfare—some of which has been proved, some of which has not. If the Cuban charges are true—and we believe that this article will help demonstrate that they are—then the dengue fever epidemic of 1981 was only the latest in a long line of outrageous, immoral, and illegal CBW attacks against Cuba.*

The History of Attacks

Many studies have been written on the CBW capabilities of the United States. Some have discussed specifics; some have mentioned Cuba. John Marks, Victor Marchetti, Philip Agee, and Seymour Hersh have all discussed various specifics. Shortly after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, during the early 1960s, food poisoning attempts were common, often at the same time that crop burnings were being carried out. A *Washington Post* report (September 16, 1977) confirmed that during this time the CIA maintained an "anti-crop warfare" program. Both the CIA and the Army were studying biological warfare, primarily at the facilities of Fort Detrick, Maryland. Dr. Marc Lappe noted in his book, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: The Science of Public Death," that the Army had a biological warfare agent prepared for use against Cuba at the time of the missile crisis in 1962; it was most likely Q fever. [See *Sources and Methods* in *CAIB* Number 16.]

Throughout the 1960s there were occasional biological attacks against Cuba, sometimes, according to Cuban allegations in 1964, involving apparent weather balloons. And in 1970 the CIA engineered the introduction of African swine fever into Cuba, a successful operation carried out by Cuban exile agents. [See Warren Hineke and William Turner, "The Fish Is Red," p. 293.] It led to the forced destruction of more than a half million pigs. The same groups attempted unsuccessfully a few months later to

infect the Cuban poultry industry. These operations were first exposed in *Newsday* (January 9, 1977), and later appeared in the *Washington Post*, *Le Monde*, the *Guardian*, and other papers.

Then, in 1980—the year of the plagues—Cuba was beset with disasters. Another African swine fever epidemic hit; the tobacco crop was decimated by blue mould; and the sugar cane crops were hit with a particularly damaging rust disease. As the *Nation* put it, this was "a conjunction of plagues that would lead people less paranoid about the U.S. than the Cubans to wonder whether human hands had played a role in these natural disasters . . ."

It is against this backdrop that the Cubans found themselves facing, in the spring and summer of 1981, an unprecedented epidemic of hemorrhagic dengue fever.

Why Dengue?

As noted above, and elsewhere in this issue, the arsenal of chemical and biological warfare is unlimited. The U.S. military and the CIA have experimented with diseases which merely make a person uncomfortable for a few hours, with toxins which kill instantly, and with everything in between. John Marks describes a few in his study of MKULTRA, the CIA's mind control experiment, "The Search for the Manchurian Candidate." Staphylococcal enterotoxin, for example, a mild food poisoning, would incapacitate its victim for three to six hours; Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) virus would immobilize a person for two to five days and keep its victims weak for perhaps another month; brucellosis would keep its victims in the hospital for three or more months, killing some. Even the deadly poisons were prepared with variations: shellfish toxin kills within a few seconds; hotulinum, however, takes eight to 12 hours, giving the assassin time to get away.

Dengue fever is one of some 250 arthropod-borne viruses, or "arboviruses," diseases transmitted from one vertebrate to another by hematophagous arthropods—blood eating insects, usually mosquitoes. Dengue is transmitted by the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito, the same insect which transmits yellow fever. There are four types of dengue, numbered 1 through 4, depending on the type of antibody which the virus induces. Normal dengue fever begins with the same symptoms as a severe cold or flu, watery eyes, runny nose, headache, backache, fever, insomnia, lack of appetite and weakness. The bone pain is incapacitating. Indeed, dengue was once known as "break bone." Its characteristic symptom is pain at the back of the eyes, most

*While it is beyond the scope of this article, it appears that the Afghan government and the Soviet government have accused the U.S. of very similar biological warfare in Afghanistan. Reports in February 1982 suggested that CIA operatives at a research center in Lahore, Pakistan, though pretending to be engaged in malaria eradication, were actually experimenting in the spread of dengue and yellow fever. The reports first appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on February 3, 1982, and were carried the next day by TPI.

noticeable when looking from side to side. All types of dengue can give rise to the hemorrhagic form, that is, accompanied by internal bleeding and shock. This form is the most dangerous, especially to children, for whom it is often fatal.


Dengue and other arboviruses are ideal as biological warfare weapons for a number of reasons. Dengue, especially hemorrhagic dengue, is highly incapacitating; it can be transmitted easily through the introduction of infected mosquitoes; it will spread rapidly, especially in highly populated and damp areas. The *Aedes* mosquito bites during the day, when people are more active and less protected; moreover, in favorable winds, *Aedes* mosquitoes can travel hundreds of miles before landing, none the worse for wear. And, of course, since dengue fever is found in nature in many parts of the world, a human role in its spread is hard to detect. This is the inherent advantage of biological over chemical warfare.

The 1981 Epidemic

Although dengue fever is much more common in the Far East, there have been many outbreaks in the Caribbean and Central America during the past century. All four types have been found during the last two decades. In 1963 there was a dengue-3 outbreak in Puerto Rico and Antigua; in 1968, dengue-2 was found in Jamaica; in 1977, dengue-1 was found in Jamaica and Cuba; and in 1981, dengue-4 was found in the Lesser Antilles.

The epidemic which hit Cuba in May 1981 was of type 2 dengue with hemorrhagic shock. Except for the type 1 epidemic reported in 1977, this was the first major dengue outbreak in Cuba since 1944, and, most importantly, the first in the Caribbean since the turn of the century to involve hemorrhagic shock on a massive scale.

From May to October 1981 there were well over 300,000



reported cases, with 158 fatalities, 101 involving children under 15. At the peak of the epidemic, in early July, more than 10,000 cases per day were being reported. [See Chart I.] More than a third of the reported victims required hospitalization. By mid-October, after a massive campaign to eradicate *Aedes aegypti*, the epidemic was over.

The history of the secret war against Cuba and the virulence of this dengue epidemic were enough to generate serious suspicions that the U.S. had a hand in the dengue epidemic of 1981. But there is much more support for those suspicions than a healthy distrust of American intentions regarding Cuba.

The Clues

CAIB reviewed the reports on the epidemic of the Pan American Health Organization and of the Cuban Ministry of Public Health, and interviewed a number of health officials. There are indeed indications that the epidemic was artificially induced.

The epidemic began with the simultaneous discovery in May 1981 of three cases of hemorrhagic dengue caused by a type 2 virus. The cases arose in three widely separated parts of Cuba: Cienfuegos, Camaguey, and Havana. It is extremely unusual that such an epidemic would commence in three different localities at once. None of the initial victims had ever traveled out of the country; for that matter, none of them had recently been away from home. None had had recent contact with international travelers. Moreover, a study of persons arriving in Cuba in the month of May from known dengue areas found only a dozen such passengers (from Vietnam and Laos), all of whom were checked by the Institute of Tropical Medicine and found free of the disease. Somehow, infected mosquitoes had appeared in three provinces of Cuba at the same time. Somehow, the fever spread at an astonishing rate. There appears to be no other explanation but the artificial introduction of infected mosquitoes.

Another, less sinister conclusion might be possible if there were epidemics raging in neighboring islands. But, on the contrary, there were no epidemics taking place elsewhere in the Caribbean. Statistics published by the Pan American Health Organization show that during the first eight months of 1981, when there were over 300,000 cases of dengue in Cuba, there were no cases reported in Jamaica, none in the Bahamas, and only 22 in Haiti. In all the rest of the Caribbean and Central America, there were less than 6,000 cases of dengue, half of them in Colombia. [See Chart II.] And, most significantly, only in Cuba were the cases mostly hemorrhagic.

Chart I

Dengue Epidemic in Cuba, June 9 to October 10, 1981*

Week	Cases That Week	Average Per Day	Running Total
June 9-15	9,711	1,387	9,711**
June 16-22	25,713	3,673	35,424
June 23-29	40,315	5,739	75,739
June 30-July 6	68,801	9,829	144,540
July 7-13	51,136	7,304	195,676
July 14-20	35,452	5,084	231,128
July 21-27	24,183	3,454	255,311
July 28-Aug. 3	23,975	3,424	279,286
August 4-10	18,331	2,619	297,617
August 11-17	11,757	1,680	309,374
August 18-24	5,592	799	314,966
August 25-31	2,350	336	317,316
September 1-7	741	106	318,057
September 8-14	202	29	318,259
September 15-21	24	3	318,283
September 22-30	40	4	318,323
October 1-10	12	1	318,335

* From Cuban Ministry of Public Health.

**Running total figures do not include cases reported prior to June 9.

Chart II**Pan American Health Organization
Report of August 27, 1981**

Country	Reported Cases of Dengue, 1981
Anguilla	1
Antigua	3
Barbados	1
Colombia	2,872
Cuba	337,160
Dominica	6
El Salvador	943
Grenada	2
Guatemala	16
Haiti	22
Honduras	683
Mexico	831
Montserrat	1
Puerto Rico	282
St. Lucia	2
Trinidad & Tobago	4
United States	2

Weather Modification?

Yet another peculiarity involves the unprecedented rainfall throughout much of Cuba during the winter and spring preceding the epidemic. This led to an unusual accumulation of mosquito breeding areas, which undoubtedly helped the spread of the dengue once infected insects arrived. Statistics for the three provinces in which the epidemic began show that rainfall in March, for example, was double the average. [See Chart III.] Similar statistics prevailed in more than half the provinces of the country.

Chart III**Rainfall (mm.) Cuba, March 1981***

Province	Actual	Average	Increase Over Average
Cienfuegos	86	47	+83%
La Havana	75	53	+42%
Camaguey	91	37	+146%

*From Cuban Ministry of Public Health.

Whether this unusual precipitation was the result of artificial weather modification coordinated with the release of infected *Aedes* mosquitoes or merely a fortuitous coincidence taken advantage of by the planners of this action is not provable at this time. It is clear though that the increase in precipitation was dramatic, and it is well known that the U.S. has been involved in weather modification for many years. It is known that cloud seeding was used in the Vietnam War in an attempt to cause the weakening of dikes and the flooding of rice fields. But it has also been noted that Cuba was the victim of weather modification.

"During 1969 and 1970," according to Warren Hinckle and William Turner in "The Fish Is Red," "the CIA deployed futuristic weather modification technology to ravage Cuba's sugar crop and undermine the economy. Planes from the China Lake Naval Weapons Center in the Cali-

fornia desert, where hi tech was developed, overflew the island, seeding rain clouds with crystals that precipitated torrential rains over nonagricultural areas and left the cane fields arid (the downpours caused killer flash floods in some areas)."

If that kind of pinpoint accuracy was possible, and Hinckle and Turner got their information from participants, then preparing the breeding grounds for mosquitoes would be a simple task.

Arbovirus Research

Most important, perhaps, is U.S. familiarity with arbovirus transmission, with years of biological warfare research involving *Aedes* and other mosquitoes and dengue and other fevers. As has been documented in Seymour Hersh's "Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal," the U.S. has been experimenting with dengue fever since at least 1959, primarily at Fort Detrick in Maryland and at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Washington. Public reports as early as 1963 (e.g., *Military Medicine*, February 1963) stressed a need for research into arbovirus biological warfare. Of course, these early public reports did not point out that such research was already taking place. Also, there are reports that as early as 1972 U.S. researchers were working on possible vaccines against type 2 dengue.

A review of publicly available summaries of research projects confirms the government's open sponsorship of extensive research into dengue fever and related diseases for many years. Dozens of these projects, costing millions of dollars, have been funded by the Department of Defense. The justifications stated are, of course, defensive; "essential in formulating preventive measures for the protection of ground forces if committed to those areas," is how one summary puts it. But the public summaries recognize that arboviruses may be used in biological warfare. One notes that research into the debilitating effects of dengue fever is necessary not only to protect against "natural threats to U.S. forces in various parts of the world," but also because they are diseases "against which medical defenses will be required should they be used as biological agents." All the reports suggest that the U.S. wants to know about chemical and biological warfare only for defensive purposes because others might use it against the U.S. Therein lies the difficulty in fighting the CBW trend. Research for "defensive" purposes and research for "offensive" purposes are indistinguishable.

The connections between the academic community and the government, especially the military, are pervasive. Nearly all the leading researchers have been connected intimately with military investigations into chemical and biological warfare.

One leading scientist in this field is Dr. Charles Calisher, an arbovirus expert for the Pan American Health Organization, a division of the World Health Organization. Since 1971 Dr. Calisher has worked at the Fort Collins laboratories of the U.S. Center for Disease Control in Georgia. Dr. Calisher has of late been viewed with extreme suspicion by Cuban health officials. As noted above, from 1944 to 1977 there was virtually no dengue in Cuba; nevertheless, health officials were always concerned about arboviruses because of the prevalence of mosquitoes. In 1972 Cuban health officials began a serious study of dengue, including attend-

ance at PAHO meetings. At a 1974 meeting Calisher made many inquiries about dengue in Cuba and expressed a strong desire to visit and study the arbovirus situation in Cuba. In 1975 he visited the island; according to Cuban sources Dr. Calisher predicted at that time that Cuba might face a dengue epidemic within two years, because, he said, of their relations with Africa. Then, in 1977, for the first time in 33 years, there was a dengue epidemic in Cuba.

When Cuban officials charged that the 1981 epidemic was a clandestine operation of the U.S., Dr. Calisher was one of the U.S. experts who publicly belittled the accusation, pointing out that there were many mosquitoes on Cuba, and stressing its relations with nations of Africa and Southeast Asia. This "explanation" was given even though, as noted above, visitors from dengue areas had been checked and even though the initial cases were unrelated to foreign travel.

Another of the most active researchers today is Dr. William F. Scherer of Cornell University. According to his entry in "Who's Who," from 1965 to 1972 he directed the viral infection committee of the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board. Dr. Scherer has directed a number of projects, often with Department of Defense funding, study-

Defense Department arbovirus research is still going on. On February 17, 1982 the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering delivered to the Senate a required report on "funds obligated in the chemical warfare and biological defense research programs during FY 1981." (The term "biological defense" is always used even though there is virtually no difference between biological offense and biological defense research. This is in large part because a 1972 treaty to which the U.S. is a party outlaws biological warfare research, development, or stockpiling, *except* for defensive research.) The report noted nearly \$12 million was obligated to "risk assessment and evaluation of viral agents and their vectors that pose a BW threat." The studies included investigations into the "growth and survival" of various arboviruses in mosquitoes, "new techniques" for infecting mosquitoes with hemorrhagic fevers, and other such "defensive" research.

Conclusions


That the dengue epidemic *could* have been a covert U.S. operation is clear. It is a plausible hypothesis, consistent with past actions. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the U.S. has been investigating the biological warfare possibilities of dengue fever for many years. And it is U.S. experimentation which has shown that *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes (infected with dengue) could travel hundreds of miles, along the path of the prevailing winds, from the place of release to the place of landing. A boat off the coast of Florida at the right time with the right winds could sprinkle mosquitoes on Cuba with no fear of infecting the mainland. Of course, it is also possible that a ship or plane based at Guantanamo could have been used.

That the epidemic was an American covert action is less easily demonstrated, but there are many indications that this is true, and that the Cuban accusation is valid. The most significant fact is the simultaneous outbreak of the disease in three widely separated locations. When one confirms, as CAIB has done, that these first three cases did not involve foreign travel or contact with foreign travelers, and one confirms, as we have done, that the people who arrived in Cuba from dengue infected areas during the several weeks preceding the outbreak were not infected, the only logical conclusion is the artificial introduction of the disease. Moreover, there were no epidemics in nearby countries.

In addition, this was the first time in the Caribbean in this century that an epidemic of this size involved hemorrhagic shock, the most dangerous form of dengue fever. Dengue fever, as a biological weapon, would undoubtedly be of the hemorrhagic form.

And, finally, there is the unusual precipitation shortly before the outbreak of the epidemic. For such an operation to be successful, it would be necessary to ensure a very large mosquito population at the time of the introduction of the infected vectors; otherwise the rapid and devastating spread of the disease would not be guaranteed.

Perhaps some day the full truth will be known. But for those who have studied the recent history of the United States, for those who know of what it is capable, for those who see the absence of any morality in the vicious, uninterrupted 23-year campaign against Cuba, for them there is no justification whatsoever to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt.

 SMITHSONIAN SCIENCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE Room 300 • 1770 M Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. • 20036 Telephone: (202) 381-4213 • Telex: 99495		SIA-17370-1d
NOTICE OF RESEARCH PROJECT		
U.S. Dept. of Defense Army Medical Research & Development Command Walter Reed Army Inst. of Research Washington, District of Columbia 20312	Contact DADA7270 ADA17-72-C-2180	
STUDIES ON ARBOVIRUS BORNE VIRUSES		
Dr. Scherer, Dept. of Microbiology		
Cornell University Medical Center Cornell Medical College 1300 York Ave., New York, New York 10021		
TO STUDY ECOLOGIES, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND IMPORTANCE TO MAN AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS OF ARBOVIRUSES POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE MILITARY IN TROPICAL REGIONS AND CENTRAL AMERICA. TO INVESTIGATE MECHANISMS OF POSSIBLE INTERSPECIFIC TRANSMISSION OF ARBOVIRUSES. TO STUDY THE CORRELATION OF ARBOVIRUSES PATTERNS OF VIRULENCE AND PATHOGENICITY. TO CONTINUE STUDIES OF UNCLASSIFIED VIRUSES FROM JAPANESE MOSQUITOES AND BIRDS.		
APPROACH - FIELD AND LABORATORY INVESTIGATIONS ARE CONDUCTED ALONG THE TROPICAL EASTERN COAST OF MEXICO. VIRUSES ARE ISOLATED IN CELL CULTURES AND ANIMALS AND ANTIBODIES DETECTED BY ELISA, AND NEUTRALIZATION TESTS. THE EFFECTS OF VIRUS ARE BEING TREATED WITH CHEMICALS TO LEARN THEIR IMPORTANCE IN PATHOGENICITY. POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION EXPERIMENTS ARE CURRENTLY WITH JAPANESE VIRUSES.		
ACRONYMS: 1. Funding details (see sources): FY75 1 69,451 FY76 4 77,806 FY77 1 94,979		

ing arbovirus vectors—that is, the hosts which transmit the viruses from one victim to another. These studies, in which he has been engaged since 1972, have covered the use as vectors of various species of mosquitoes and, in addition, birds and bats.

Agent Exposes Secret Mission

It was in March that *CAIB* first heard from Scott Barnes—a former police informer, undercover cop, drug enforcement agent, and military policeman. Barnes, only 28, had spent the last nine years in such marginal work, from the time he was still in high school in Redondo Beach, California, near Los Angeles. Now he had a shocking, almost unbelievable, tale to tell. He had given his story, he said, to ABC-TV and to Jack Anderson but neither had used it. After waiting weeks, on the advice of “a friend at the Pentagon” he contacted *CovertAction*.

Barnes said that in October and November 1981 he was one of a team of six Americans who were sent into Laos from Thailand by the CIA. Their mission, they thought, was to locate and if possible rescue American prisoners of war held since the final days of the Vietnam War. This mission, Barnes said, had the cooperation of a Member of Congress, was coordinated by a former war hero now working undercover for the CIA, and was directed by the CIA Chief of Station in Bangkok and his predecessor, now living in Vienna, Virginia.

As Barnes described it, the team did locate two “Caucasians,” apparently Americans captured in Laos. But they appeared “recently” captured. Moreover, after the team reported their find, noting that rescue seemed difficult, they were ordered to try to kill the two captives. The team refused, disbanded the mission, and returned to the U.S. They never intended to discuss what had really happened. But the only explanation for the incredible orders, Barnes thought, was that the Americans were involved in planting false evidence of the use of yellow rain. The government was afraid the Laotians would exploit this, perhaps in a show trial.

Barnes would not have spoken out at all, he says, but for the fact that the coordinator of the mission, James “Bo” Gritz, a former Green Beret Colonel, started giving newspaper interviews in December and January, telling a very different story from what Barnes says was the truth. Barnes then decided to approach ABC—some six weeks before he called *CAIB*.

CAIB interviewed Barnes several times, at length. A transcript of a recording of one interview was prepared and, with a press release from *CAIB*, circulated to the media in April. We found it very puzzling, to say the least, that the media had not carried Barnes’s story. Even if they could not prove it, even if they did not believe it, the allegations alone would be news. We later learned that the media insisted they needed more “confirmation,” which did not stop them from running with the Libyan “hit squad” fabrication, nor prevent them from playing up Bo Gritz’s side of the story.

CAIB’s widely distributed press release moved a number of journalists to contact the key figures in Barnes’s tale, as well as Pentagon and CIA sources. Most denied a lot that Barnes had to say; almost all denied the key assertions that the mission was official, that Americans did go into Laos, and most importantly that there were assassination orders from the CIA in Virginia. But the denials were not consistent. One person, for example, denied that the mission had used phony cards identifying the team as Congressional aides; another said there was such a mission but it did not go into Laos; another said the mission did go into Laos, but it was a privately sponsored, not a CIA, operation. Bo Gritz at first denied knowing Barnes, denied giving him any support, denied meeting with him and exiled Lao General Vang Pao at a Congressman’s office, all denials he later retracted. Daniel Arnold, the former CIA Chief in Bangkok now president of Tashkent Associates in Vienna denied any role in such a mission. As he told a *Daily World* reporter, “Because I was a former CIA officer people seem to think we are an unscrupulous bunch of rogues who would undertake such a monstrous plot . . .” But Arnold did not deny his former high Agency position, nor did he deny that he forwarded messages from Lao rebels in Thailand to Vang Pao, now living in Montana, messages brought to him by Barnes.

Arnold’s name was in the news in May when stories surfaced that career diplomat Morton Abramowitz had been blocked from accepting the offer of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. One of those “widely reported to be involved,” according to the *Washington Post*, was Arnold, “who was CIA station chief in Bangkok for about a year during Abramowitz’s tenure as ambassador.” Arnold denied any friction while the two were both posted to Bangkok, but said they “quarreled in late 1980 over his return to Bangkok as a private consultant after retiring from the CIA.” Arnold, in fact, is now a registered, paid agent for the Thai government.

Kevin Cody, editor of the *Easy Rider* in Hermosa Beach, California, took the *CAIB* press release seriously. His paper covers the district represented by conservative Republican Robert Dornan—the Congressman named by Barnes. Cody interviewed most of the key people and published a lengthy article, which he has given *CAIB* permission to reprint. As he notes, no one, despite all the denials, has been able to show that Scott Barnes is lying. Week by week more of Barnes’s narrative is confirmed.

Early on we received a telephone call from “John,” who confirmed all of Barnes’s story, but who said he was afraid to go public. John—possibly John Akins, who Barnes says was one of the six on his mission—has never called back.

Shortly before going to press we received a Mailgram from Vienna, Virginia, from a name not listed by the telephone company at that address, advising us that we would never understand completely what "TF157-Bohica" was all about. "Operation Bohica" was the codename Barnes said was given to the mission. But the reference to Task Force 157, the secret Navy-CIA cover operation for which fugitive Edwin Wilson worked, was a new piece in the puzzle.

And most surprising of all has been the mysterious death of Jerry Daniels in Bangkok, described below. Daniels, who worked with Lao exiles and rebels, expressed his disbelief to journalists of the yellow rain evidence touted so much by the State Department. His mysterious death

not, apparently, the first such strange demise at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok adds credence to the can of worms which Barnes seems to have opened. Moreover, as we began to hear about the Daniels case at CAIB we received a telephone threat, to "stay away from the Daniels investigation."

We are convinced that only the tip of the iceberg has been exposed at this time. We hope that these articles will generate further investigations and that more people with first hand information will come forward. What follows are: Excerpts from CAIB's interview with Scott Barnes; Kevin Cody's *Easy Rider* article; and Ellen Ray's article on the Jerry Daniels case.

Excerpts from CAIB- Scott Barnes Interview

March 28, 1982

I was over in Hawaii to visit a friend who was sick. An ex-SOG [Secret Operating Group] operator got in touch with me about this proposal, which we all thought was a rescue proposal. Bo Gritz got in touch with me through the SOG guys who had told him that I knew Vang Pao. Bo Gritz was under cover, pretending to work for Hughes. He said that he was involved in Operation Velvet Hammer and that the government came in and asked him to publicly step down so they could secretly go in there [Laos] and try to verify via SR-71 photos and some reconnaissance groups, and so he did that in June of eighty-one, and then General Aaron out of the Pentagon has asked him to prepare for an "invasion into Laos."

An invasion by whom?

An invasion by American special forces. And he said it would be a three-team crossing, and he had ordered some very sophisticated weapons, contacts, and he asked for a meeting with General Vang Pao, so I arranged that, and he asked for a meeting with Congressman Bob Dornan [Rep.-Calif.] and I arranged that.

Bo wanted these meetings, because the Agency figured it'd be a good cover to use Congressman Dornan. We had some phony business cards made up with our names, that we were staff aides to Congressman Dornan. That way,

while down there, we could claim political asylum if we got caught at any of the cross-border checks.

Did Dornan know all about this?

Yeah. Oh, yeah.

And he cooperated with it?

Oh, absolutely. He set up a meeting with General David Jones, and was conferring with General Jones and President Reagan on the matter.

Do you know if other Members of Congress knew about it?

No others. Nobody else knew. Nobody. We dubbed it Operation Bohica. And then in October he arranged for some Agency aides to come out and some Green Berets, and we met in Westchester [California].

How many people were there when you met?

There were six, six Americans, and there were four others that were shadowing us to make sure we weren't followed or we didn't back out, and I never met them. I don't know who they were.

The six, were they all former Green Berets?

All but one. One was out of Ft. Meade, Maryland. He was an intelligence analyst. So then Bo said that we got the approval from the Agency to go ahead, and he said about two days' planning. He'd gotten some phony business cards made, and we were to use a Telex in the Department of Energy communications center in Washington, DC, to send overseas Telexes via a code. That way, foreign agents intercepting information would not suspect that we used a DOE Telex. We met with the station chief for the CIA at the United States Embassy in Bangkok. Prior to that I had been down at the Embassy and had met with an Agency pilot, helicopter pilot. I was at the Embassy in June to prepare the future operation of October, November. And I met with DIA people, and then I touched bases with some foreign types of agents that were helping us out through General Vang Pao.

Did Vang Pao ever leave Montana for any of these



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things, or were people just in touch by phone?

No, I brought him down to California and brought him into Congressman Dornan's office, and had some meetings where he actually signed in on Congressman Dornan's personal ledger, along with Bo Gritz, myself, and another foreign intelligence agent. Then later on the Congressman's aide called me, and said, "Gosh, I made a mistake. I didn't want any of you guys to sign in in my office." So he sent me the ledger in the mail, so I would see that it was the original, so I would destroy it. However, the way politics works, I didn't destroy it, I kept it.

You said there was a foreign intelligence person with you?

Yes. We were cooperating with another country's agent. I think he was out of China. We were trying to work something out with the Chinese people.

Taiwan or People's Republic?

People's Republic. They were going to "slap the hand of Vietnam" while a lot of guerrilla activity was going on, in Mahaxai, Gnommerat, the Mugia Pass, and Nape in Laos. Well, when we were down there the second time, we equipped a team of indigenous to take a team across the river [the Mekong] and verified that there were some Caucasians, known or unknown that they were Americans, but it was obvious that they were probably Americans.

This was across the river from where to where?

We went across at Ban Pheng, Thailand, straight across 47 km, roughly to Mahaxai, just a little bit to the west of Mahaxai.

This is in Laos?



Barnes with a Lao guerrilla at camp in Ban Phang, Thailand.

Right. We verified that there were Caucasians and sent a Telex.

How many were there?

Two Caucasians.

And when you say verified, you mean somebody actually got to see them?

Yes. We had some 30-odd indigenous forces with us. And then Daniel Arnold, the former station chief for the CIA in Bangkok sent some communications and we got the message that Bo Gritz was cut off, no longer to send messages to him and no longer to trust him.

He was not with you on the mission?

No, no. He stayed in the United States. So then the Chief of Station from the U.S. Embassy brought up a coded message through some of his agents from Nakhon Phanom and we put that together with a Telex message we got back from Langley, Virginia, telling us in essence if these are in fact Americans, assassinate them. And we got in an argument, and split, and went our ways.

Did you all go back to the base in Thailand where you started out from?

Yes. We all went back to Bangkok, and one of the guys, intelligence guys, decided to go and be debriefed prior to returning to the United States. Two of the Green Berets decided that they were going to go to Hawaii and lay low for about a week before returning to the mainland, and then they were going to disappear. And the other guy decided that in the meantime he was going to go to Japan and then filter on back to the United States via Canada.

Was everybody traveling under their own individual covers at that point?

Yes. We all decided to disband quickly.

So far as you know, everybody got back their own separate ways?

Yeah, as far as I know. I only talked to one of them some time ago, and he said, "Forget we ever went, forget we ever talked to anybody."

Did you ever learn or suspect what it was that the Americans who were captured in Laos might have known or what it was they didn't want the Laotians to find out?

Two things. One is that possibly the United States was involved in getting chemical warfare, biological stuff over there.

You mean they might have been planting yellow rain stuff?

Right. That was one of the suspicions that was discussed over there. The other one was that these "guys" might have been involved in a secret operation as late as '79 or '80 and got captured. And could tell some pretty horrendous stories about what was really going on if they were forced to. And it was best that they not ever come back.

But did they have any way or reason to believe that whatever it was that they knew they would not already have revealed?

Not that I know of. They had a previous operation that had been scouting the area and setting up booby traps and stuff and there's no way of really telling except for nothing ever came out through international channels.

The area where the Americans were being held, do you know if that was anywhere near the region where evidence of yellow rain was supposedly being found?

Oh yes. It was right in that area. About which Haig himself made the accusation last year.

But you never found out any more to confirm that that is what it was?

No, I never did, I just decided it was best to leave as soon as possible.

Did you ever hear from anyone else from the mission?

The only person I heard from was John. ["John" also spoke by phone with CAIB and confirmed all of Barnes's story, but refused to say where he was. John said he wanted Barnes's story to come out, because he was frightened, and had heard that two of the members of the mission had met untimely deaths, one in Libya and one in Guatemala.]

How did he know how to reach you?

Well, I left a number for him that I would be at for a week, and we contacted each other and decided that for better or worse it was best we never say anything happened, and we'll keep a close eye on the local newspapers. And next thing we know, Bo Gritz is going all over the country talking.

Do you know why Bo started talking; do you have any idea?

Yes. We think it is because he was supposed to come back as a full bird colonel and was supposed to work out of DIA Section 7B as a full bird, and was turned down. I think as an insurance policy he decided to start talking. Because he got pressure from the Secret Service about the Middle East connection.

You mean he came under pressure for things unrelated to Laos?

Right.

What kind of stuff was that?

About some Special Forces guys going to Chad and Sudan, and a couple of guys he had sent down to El Salvador to start doing some training, and allegedly the United States wasn't doing any of this stuff. He was trying to get teams together for the Company to send to obscure places in El Salvador, recruiting some of the old people. I think one of the guys from our mission is there.

But this is stuff he was doing as a government employee?

Right.

This was not free lance stuff?

Right.

Who was he working for, was that CIA?

This was under the direction of the Agency. Matter of fact, I'll give you their extension number back at Langley, if you want it.

How did you have these numbers for him, and that information?

Well, he knew that I was really tight with General Vang Pao, and so he said that if anything ever happens, call area code 202, 351-1100, and ask for extension 6145. That's supposedly called CDO, which is apparently where John Stein was in charge of covert defense operations.

Did you ever call him there?

I did once.

After this mission?

Yes. The day I got back to the United States I called, asked for the extension, and that time gave the code name Bohica, and next thing the guy says okay, give me your number and let me secure a line. And he called back. He said, "Forget this thing ever existed."

But did you ask him about the bottom line, we didn't know we were going to be told to kill anybody?

Right. I asked him that and said, "You know we were all

surprised about the very sophisticated weapons that were provided," and he just said, "You don't know anything, you didn't hear anything, nobody knows anything, this number doesn't exist. Just take the money and go have a good time." And Daniel Arnold, he was a major figure in this operation. He allegedly is retired from the Agency, and he's running a private company, International Research Associates, area code 703, 938-1868, in Vienna. [The other company on the business card is Tashkent Associates.] I also have the business card that Dan sent me thanking me for a letter, a secret letter I picked up down there to be delivered to the authorities back here in the United States.

A letter you picked up where?

From Laos.

So there were other things besides looking for the Americans?

I was supposed to pick up a letter and contact some foreign indigenous agents that had been working with the Hmong previously, on chemical warfare operations.

Do you know what those things were?

They kept that real hush hush.

You never knew whether they were planting evidence?

No, it was pretty much speculated though, and we sat down one day with one of them and I brought back one of the letters and decided to make a copy of it, and keep it, which I did.

How did the journalists get in touch with you?

I got a call from a couple of guys out of the Pentagon that knew all about this that I had been dealing with, and they said, "Look, we know we were duped, this whole thing was wrong, and we're going to give you some names of people, numbers to contact and don't tell them you heard from us in the Pentagon," and I'm not going to tell anybody who they were, so they can feel safe.

Were they making the point that they thought this was a rescue mission?

They themselves all thought and Deputy Inman of the CIA, he himself thought, it was a rescue mission too, he said. He said, if this was true, that we were going to assassinate people, it had to be renegades. He said it might be people like Wilson and Terpil or Agee or Marchetti or agents like that who are no good any more. He said maybe they tried to take it on their own and just end the problem, but he would never admit it.

How could he say that? You got a telegram from Langley.

Oh, we got all kinds of Telexes.

But they couldn't very well have been from anybody like Marchetti or Agee?

Oh I know. But he was using their names as former agents being renegades, who could have used Agency communications or Agency funding to do their own secret operation.

Did you actually speak with him personally?

No, Ted Koppel did, and related that back.

But how does he justify or explain the fact that the instructions came from Langley?

He says, "Prove it." And we said, "Okay, let's go to the Department of Energy, communications center, and see all the Telexes from this date to this date under Subject Bohica." And then he flipped his head and said, "How did you guys know about Subject Bohica?" And he says that due to national security, nothing can be discussed.

You mean Koppel mentioned the name of the operation to Innon?

Yeah, then he just flipped out. He said there's a law coming to pass, if you guys start revealing agents' names you're going to be tried and prosecuted, criminally.

Basically, everybody who seems to have known anything about it is taking the position that they all thought it was an operation to rescue someone, not to kill someone?

Right.

And yet the coded messages came both from Langley and from the Chief of Station.

Right. At the U.S. Embassy.

Has anybody said to you that they've been in touch with him?

One of the guys said that he didn't know. All he was doing was taking part of the secret message and delivering it to the appropriate people. He said, "I don't know what was in it. It came over in," I think he told me, "an ERKS 53 computer."

So he was passing a message but he didn't know what it was?

Right. He said the message came from Langley to Bangkok and then he just forwarded it on from Bangkok. No, he didn't say Langley, he said Virginia.

How did you receive communications when you were in the field in Laos, by radio?

No. We took in an awful lot of radios and other equipment that Uncle Sam provided, but we didn't communicate across the river. We came across and went down to Nakhon Phanom and sent messages via Telex to the Rajah Motel in Bangkok to the Department of Energy, Com. center, Washington, DC, Attn: Subject Bohica. The following purchase items are necessary, C7, A11, and so on.

And then the messages would come back the same way?

Right.

They'd go from DOE, Washington directly to the Rajah Motel?

Right.

And then you had somebody who would pick them up there?

Right. And then filter them up to the guys at Nakhon Phanom.

And then go back across the river?

Right.

So when you were all together and got the message that was telling you that these people couldn't be rescued, to bump them off, you were back inside the Thailand side of the border then?

Right. We were back in Nakhon Phanom. Because when they told us that the Huey pilot, all of a sudden the government pulled him out of Thailand and sent back on orders to the United States, we started getting rather suspicious. You know we had all things set up and everything was squared away, and then all of a sudden . . .

When you say all set up, you mean all set up for a rescue attempt?

Right.

Then what sort of a plan was supposed to be involved if you were killing the people instead of rescuing them? You still needed a helicopter, didn't you?

No, because they were going to go in via indigenous and if we couldn't accomplish it, then we had large sums of money and were able to purchase medicine and stuff in



Scott Barnes in Thailand.

Thailand to give to certain indigenous. One of them would carry out any orders, no matter what they were. If we couldn't accomplish it, we had to abort, then the stuff was supposed to be up to him and he would accomplish it. As far as I know, he may have accomplished it.

You never got any details from there once you left?

No. Once we left, I cut communications. I talked to General Vang Pao about three or four weeks ago, and he just said, "The thing for us to do right now is just, we never knew each other."

Have you offered to go testify before the Intelligence Committee?

Yes. I told them, I said, "Hey put me on another government polygraph exam. You guys hired the world's best one, you sent me to a shrink, I got photos, I'll bring you documentation." And he said, "But you don't understand, Scott. You don't understand what you're saying." I said, "Yeah, I know." He said, "There are a lot of problems in the Middle East, in international conflicts; we went across a sovereign nation's border. In other words we engaged in an act of war." And I said, "I know that, and it was wrong, because I wouldn't have said anything if we were going to rescue, but when I found out what the truth was, I think it's wrong." And he said, "So do I." I said, "Let's have a Senate hearing," and he said, "We're having hearings but they're secret. We don't want the public to know." I said, "I think that's wrong. Why don't you guys want the truth out?" ●

Scott Barnes:

Spook or Spoof?

By Kevin Cody

"Scott Barnes is a Walter Mitty type," says South Bay Congressman Robert K. Dornan.

Retired Green Beret Lieutenant Colonel James "Bo" Gritz, described by his General during the Vietnam War as the "best commander of special mission commandos in the United States Army," says of Scott Barnes, "If you believe anything he says you're playing with the wrong end of the stick."

Ted Koppel of ABC *Nightline* completed eight hours of taping with Scott Barnes six weeks ago and planned a three-part report about him. But *Nightline* senior producer Stew Schwartz told *Easy Reader* Monday, "We are not preparing a program (on Scott Barnes)."

Columnist Jack Anderson's office also interviewed Barnes over six weeks ago, but has yet to make mention of Barnes in print.

Monday morning *Easy Reader* received a call from a person identifying himself as Garth Williams, a *Los Angeles Times* reporter. The man said, "I've heard rumors you're planning a story about Scott Barnes. Barnes is full of lies and I advise you to really research this before printing anything about him." A check with the *Times* personnel department revealed they do not have a reporter named Garth Williams.

A brief recounting of Barnes' story is sufficient for understanding why the 28-year-old Redondo resident is viewed with suspicion and skepticism.

Barnes claims to have been part of a U.S. government supported team of ex-Green Berets who crossed the Mekong River from Thailand into northern Laos in October, 1981 to search for American prisoners of war. Upon locating and photographing two Caucasians in a prison camp, Barnes says the team received orders to assassinate the prisoners. He says the team refused to follow the orders and disbanded.

Barnes says Congressman Robert Dornan's office,

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Hughes Aircraft in El Segundo, and a 'safe house' in Playa del Rey were used as covers to make the operation appear to be the work of renegade, ex-Green Berets.

Scott Barnes' Story

I first met and interviewed Scott Barnes at Hope Chapel in Hermosa, where he was recently "reborn," and where he spends much of his free time in preparation to become a minister. He is six-foot, 190 pounds, with a beard and a baby face. His dark glasses, leather jacket and grey, late model automobile, conspicuous only for its lack of even model name markings, earmark him as an undercover agent.

For the interview he had prepared copies of half a dozen of his letters of commendation, dating from a 1973 Department of Treasury letter thanking him for his assistance, while still at Redondo High School, in the arrest of a subject "illegally manufacturing numerous bombs." The most recent letter, dated March 16, 1978, from the San Diego District Attorney's office, noted, "We have worked with Officer Scott Barnes since 1976 on matters concerning outlaw motorcyclists. These offenses have ranged from narcotics to conspiracy to commit murder."

A copy of Barnes' FBI report revealed he had been in the army "attached to the 14th Military Police at Fort Lewis, Washington." But the 10 page report revealed very little else because it is almost entirely blacked out.

Of the more curious items he produced were photos he said were taken of himself and other team members on the Mekong River, copies of business cards identifying him as a staff assistant to Congressman Dornan, and a page from Dornan's office guest book.

The significance of the page from Dornan's guest book is that it lists the names of Barnes, Bo Gritz and General Vang Pao under the date of August 26. Barnes said the three men met that day in the congressman's office with Dornan aide Stan Mullin to plan an incursion into Laos.

There remain 2,456 American servicemen unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, and there have been 397 reports of first hand sightings since the fall of Saigon, the Pentagon

reports. Of the missing, 560 were lost in Laos.

General Vang Pao was a Laotian major general during the Vietnam War. His 40,000 Hmong tribespeople were a secret army for the CIA during this period.

According to Barnes, Vang Pao was asked at the meeting in Dornan's office to provide underground assistance for the mission into Laos. "In exchange for his help," said Barnes, "we were going to equip his people with a lot of firepower so they could continue their little war—lots of automatic weapons and LAWs (Light Anti-tank Weapons). These are plastic rocket launchers about three feet long that you rest on your shoulder and use to knock out aircraft on the ground and machine gun nests."

Barnes said he was first contacted about the mission, code-named "Operation Bohica, (bend over, here it comes again)," a year ago April while he was visiting Hope Chapel's church in Maui.

"An ex-SOG (Green Beret Special Operating Group) got in touch with me and said I was to get ready for a secret invasion into Laos to rescue POWs. I'm a personal friend of General Vang Pao, and was needed to gain his cooperation because you cannot do an operation down there without the underground. There are too many factions—Pathet Lao, Free Lao, Viet Cong, NVA, Hmong.

"Vang Pao had been mad at the CIA because it failed to make good on promises to his people. So to convince him this wasn't a CIA operation I arranged for him to meet Bo Gritz at Congressman Dornan's office. The CIA has its meetings on the beach or at the Taco Bell in Hermosa, not in congressmen's offices.

"Gritz was a 'retired' Green Beret working undercover at Hughes Aircraft in El Segundo."

(A phone call to the number Barnes gave for Gritz at Hughes' Advanced Program Development, Overseas Operation revealed Gritz had been, but was no longer, employed there.)

(Until asked to stop last June by the government, Gritz had been leader of a widely-publicized program called "Operation Velvet Hammer," established to train teams of ex-Green Berets to go on POW rescue missions.)

"A few days after meeting in Dornan's office, Stan Mullin called me. 'You guys signed in Dornan's guest book, I'm taking the page out because we can't put you guys in Dornan's office,' Mullin told me. Vang Pao wouldn't have wanted it known he was in Dornan's office planning an invasion either. So I told Mullin to mail the page to me and I would destroy it. But politics being what it is, I kept it.

"In October three more special forces types joined Bo and I. The sixth guy was already in Bangkok. We spent two days together in planning at a guy named Vic's house in Playa del Rey, and then four of us took off for Bangkok. Bo, who remained in the states, gave us business cards indicating we worked for Dornan, and we carried diplomatic passports, as well as blue ones so if we were picked up we could claim diplomatic immunity.

"After we arrived, another member of the team and I went across the Mekong River at Ban Pheng to just a little bit west of Mahaxai with 30 indigenous forces. We came across a prison camp where we took photos of two Caucasian prisoners, and then crossed back into Thailand near Nakhon Phanom.

"The whole time we were wondering why we had been equipped with AR 180s with silencers, night scopes, laser

sightings and teflon ammunition. Because we were supposed to be on a rescue mission and these were assassination weapons. We also were concerned that our helicopter pilot was called out of the country.

"What was really going on we didn't figure out until we got two telexes delivered to us at Nakhon Phanom, which, when put together and decoded, ordered, 'If merchandise confirmed, liquidate.'

"I heard that and said I was leaving. But as I started to get up one of the guys slapped me across the face, and then J.D. Bath, our communications specialist, calmed the guy down. Bath said, 'Yea, we better get out of here. There's a lot of firefights, and the rumor's getting around that there are Caucasians in the area.'



Barnes with J.D. Bath on Thai side of the Mekong River.

"So he and I returned to Bangkok together, and I flew back to the states.

"The day I got back I called the number I'd been given for the CIA Covert Defense Operation (CDO). When I gave the code named Bohica the guy answering the phone, "Forget this thing ever existed."

"I said, 'You know we were all surprised about the very sophisticated weapons that were provided,' and he said, 'You don't know anything, you didn't hear anything, this number doesn't exist. Just take the money and go have a good time.'

"I put the operation out of my mind until Christmas Eve morning when members of the Torrance police, David Gregg of the executive branch of the Secret Service, and Fred Capps, Jr. from FBI counter-intelligence knocked on my door in Redondo.

"They said, 'We need to talk to you about Bo Gritz and Indochina,' I said, 'I don't know what you're talking about.' And they said, 'Either you come with us now, or you can talk to a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C.'"

"They questioned me for about three hours at the Torrance Police Station. They wanted to know what really happened in Thailand, why we had such sophisticated weapons. So it was obvious someone was talking, and from reading the papers a few weeks later it looked like Bo. The *Daily Breeze*, the *Boston Globe*, and the *Chicago Tribune* all did stories about Bo's efforts to organize a POW rescue team and how the government pulled the rug out from under him. But he wasn't making any mention of what we did, or the order we received to liquidate the prisoners."

"I started to get a little bit uptight because I know Bo must be passing my name around. So through a friend at Hope Chapel I got in touch with Ted Koppel of ABC *Nightline*, and the story blew him away. He said he was going to run it in three parts, but first he needed me to take a lie detector test. He hired Chris Guggis, the best there is—he did James Earl Ray, King's assassin—and I passed 100 percent. Then Koppel asked me to take a psychiatric exam, and he hired Dr. Haeker who did the examination of Patty Hearst. And he certified that I was 100 percent square."

"Next Jack Anderson's people and the Senate Intelligence Committee began looking into my story. But no one's going public with it. They're all looking for someone else to break the story first."

Barnes said he wanted his story printed as an "insurance policy." But he also stressed he has been greatly influenced by his pastor at Hope Chapel to let the truth be known. And there is the possibility that his story could be sold to Hollywood, provided it can ever be verified.

Congressman Dornan's Story

Congressman Robert K. Dornan is fighting for his political life in his underdog bid for the Republican senatorial nomination against Barry Goldwater, Jr., Maureen Reagan, Pete Wilson and Pete McClosky. Because of the Democrats' redistricting this year he became a congressman without a district.

When I reached him by phone Friday afternoon, his mind was on the race. "We're where we hoped we'd be in the polls at this point, and the money is coming in enough so that I think we'll be competitive. If I can get one TV spot for every two of Barry's, we'll do okay," he said.

I told the congressman I was calling about Scott Barnes.

"Oh yea. Did anybody move that on the wire services?" he asked.

I told him I'd heard the story on KPFK-Pacifica radio, but that was all.

Dornan replied, "Yea, they're one of the ones I couldn't get back to."

We had a little explosion yesterday. AP called. UPI called. CBS out of New York and ABC out of Washington all called. And they all accepted what I had to say.

"It was a false story. Scott Barnes is a Walter Mitty type. What he did was come to my office last August when I was in Israel flying the F-16, and he met with a staffer, just like anybody else."

"He also asked for Stan Mullin's card (the aide Barnes met with), and had it duplicated with his name, which is

probably a violation of the law. If it isn't it should be."

"Bo Gritz, the guy he came with, I rather liked—he's for real. The *Daily Breeze* did a big story on him, and I met with him later, alone."

"Gritz is upset with the government for not following through enough on the POW thing, and so am I."

I asked Dornan if he believed Barnes had gone into Laos.

"I don't think so, but I have no way of knowing. I do believe he went to Bangkok because he throws round a lot of hotel names that are correct."

"Did you talk to Gritz about an American team going into Laos?" I asked.

Dornan said he had. "It was about him gearing up to send American teams into Laos, but they (the government) jerked the rug out from under Gritz—took away their support. That would have been last November."

"Did you talk to President Reagan about Gritz's plan," I asked Dornan.

"I told Gritz I would bring this up with President Reagan, which I did December 27 aboard Air Force 1. But I didn't talk to Reagan about anything specific. I told the president I didn't want him to lose interest in the POW's and he assured me he wouldn't. I said to him, 'Stay on top of those intelligence briefings, and if they get any hotter, please take the action you think is necessary. And, of course, Reagan's smarter than some people think he is. He's not going to comment even to his own congressman. He just said, 'Don't worry Boh. I won't forget the issue.'"

"Do you think the page out of your guest book and the use of your business cards indicate an effort by someone to use your office as a cover?" I asked Dornan.

"I have to assume premeditation. Barnes might have taken Stan's card and gotten that idea later, but the ripping out of the log book—that's too suspicious. There was premeditation there."

"Have you ever talked to Barnes?" I asked Dornan.

"Once, about two months ago," Dornan said. "I didn't recognize his name. Bo had never told me the name of the guy who was with him in that August meeting. I was having an interview with Joe Scott of the *Political Animal* when Sally (Dornan's wife) said Barnes was on the phone and was going to go public if I didn't call him within the hour. So I called him and he gave me this big story about the CIA. Frankly, I didn't buy it."

"I knew if there had been any truth to it Bo Gritz would have told me. So I just heard Barnes out."

"Barnes claims your aide mailed him the guest book page and asked him to destroy it because you didn't want it known the CIA was plotting an invasion in your office," I told Dornan.

"Why would we have mailed it to him if we felt it should have been destroyed?" Dornan asked back.

"Bo" Gritz's Story

James "Bo" Gritz, the 43-year-old retired Green Beret lieutenant colonel and recipient of five Silver Stars for his service in Viet Nam, lives in a modest house in Westchester near Loyola University with his third wife and two young children.

He is an affable, powerfully built man with a strong handshake and a strong gaze. He was wearing leather pants, a western shirt and cowboy boots when I met him Saturday morning, the day following my conversations

with Barnes and Dornan. Over the fireplace in the living room, were, as Barnes had said there would be, framed, black belt certificates for both Gritz and his wife.

Gritz's office, a small room off the garage filled with military memorabilia, was also as Barnes had described it.

"Let's start by taking a look at that page from Dornan's guest book, because I just can't imagine signing in at Dornan's office. I never sign guest books," Gritz said as we sat down.

"Here's a letter from General Vang Pao. As you can see, his signature is pretty unique."

I compared it with the signature in the guest book and there was no resemblance.

"Now here's a letter I wrote to Bobby Ray Inman (deputy director of the CIA) following our meeting on December 9. My signature is also fairly unique," Gritz said.

It too bore no resemblance to the way his name was signed in the guest book.

"Barnes is a well meaning young man, but he's on everybody's nut list," Gritz said. "And he has never done anything for the United States government. I will stake my career as a colonel with my hands on the Bible on that one."

"What I have learned about Barnes in the last year is that he has a terrible identification problem. He'll pick up on any bit of news, like the Hell's Angels thing. He called me one time, terribly excited because he was going to be on ABC *Close-Up*. He said, 'Be sure to watch it. Then you'll see who I really am, and lo and behold there was Barnes for about 10 seconds saying he was a police undercover agent who planted narcotics on the Hell's Angels so they could be arrested."

"But if you'll check with the editor in San Francisco, or with the Hell's Angels' defense attorneys you'll find out Barnes volunteered to testify on behalf of the defense, and after they checked out his story, they found it was all so much smoke."

"Check with Ron Soble at the *Los Angeles Times*. He told Soble a story that in my best day I couldn't have invented - that he had been recruited by me to work for Kadafi."

"A few weeks after that one Bill Redeker of ABC *Nightline* called me with Barnes' latest twist - that I had recruited him for an operation in which we were to locate and assassinate American POW's."

"I told Redeker basically what I'm telling you - that Barnes first contacted me after 'Velvet Hammer' went public in May, 1981."

"Barnes called me, and his first words were, 'How would you like to be a Zulu leader?' I said to him, 'What is a Zulu leader? If it means strapping a claymore (explosive) to my chest and self-destructing, no thanks.' Barnes said, 'No, we're going to rescue American POW's.' He was in Hawaii and claimed to have a group that wanted me as their leader."

"Next thing I know, Barnes is calling me collect from Thailand. He needs money because he claimed intelligence agents had stolen his passport and wallet. I told him to go to the American Embassy."

"When he came back he called and said he had secret photos showing POW camps that he wanted to show me. I agreed to meet him at a Mexican restaurant by the surfer statue at the pier in Hermosa, and I sent what he gave me through to intelligence. They informed me the photos were total fabrication."

I asked Gritz if he had seen Barnes other than that one time.

"Not that I recall," he answered.

"Has he ever been to your house?" I asked.

A full seven seconds pause elapsed before he responded. "Jesus. I don't know. We can ask my wife. It seems like she did say Barnes wanted to come over one day. He had talked to her on the phone and wanted to meet her. He thought I was such a lucky guy to have a wife like her, because his wife had walked out on him and taken his child. So I don't know if Barnes came over or not, but it's likely."

"Barnes showed me a Dornan business card with his name on it. Whose idea were those?" I asked.

"Well, I don't know what you're referring to," Gritz answered.

"The use of Dornan's business cards with agents' names listed as staff aides," I said.

"I really don't know what you're talking about," Gritz repeated. I asked him if he recalled Barnes and Mullin attending the meeting he had in Dornan's office with Vang Pao.

Gritz answered he could not recall if Mullin had been present, but he was certain Barnes wasn't.

"Barnes said you worked at Hughes as a cover," I said.

"Yea, that was arranged so I could do the things necessary to be done, and not be on the military payroll. Somebody had to pick up the tab. But I honestly prefer you not mention Hughes because they're a damn good company. If we didn't have companies like Hughes, how would we ever be able to do things?"

Gritz explained he had been asked to retire from the military in 1979 "so I could have access to the (foreign) borders without involving the United States government. Because any cross border operation, if I were a green color carrier, meaning an active duty government person, that would be an act of war."

"Who asked you to retire?" I asked.

"General Aaron, who was deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (the Pentagon's intelligence arm entrusted with official responsibility for investigating reports of missing POW's). Aaron was my group commander in Viet Nam. He first brought the POW thing to me in Panama in 1976. He told me 'Bo, we've got increasing evidence that Americans are still being held captive.'"

"The plan, until the morning of December 9, when Admiral Poulson (current head of the Defense Intelligence Agency) pulled the plug on Operation Grand Eagle, was for me to return to active duty as a Washington, D.C. project officer and be a front man for the Activity."

(Operation Grand Eagle was the "Activity's" plan to send special forces in to rescue POW's. The "Activity" refers to the Counter Terrorist Task Force, which was involved in the rescue of General Dozier in Italy. It is designed to transcend the cumbersome Joint Chiefs of Staff bureaucracy in situations where Americans abroad are in life-threatening situations. The organization has a Special Forces unit assigned to it.)

I asked Gritz if he was certain Barnes hadn't participated in anything similar to Operation Grand Eagle.

Gritz responded, "If Barnes had any capability I'd have probably hired him. But just look at Barnes. Does he look like an intelligence officer? I look like I was over there four years. But what skills does Barnes have? What's he good at?"

Rescuing prisoners? When did he last do that?"

Sorting Out

Following my morning visit with Gritz I went to see Barnes again at Hope Chapel and told him why I thought ABC and Jack Anderson hadn't done anything with his story. Dornan and Gritz are simply more believable. I myself, had no idea what to believe.

"Call J.D. Bath and ask him about 'Bohica,'" Barnes said to me. "He was our communications specialist." Barnes gave me a Florida phone number.

I made the call from the singles' pastor's office at Hope Chapel. "I'm calling about Bo Gritz and Operation Bohica," I told Bath when his wife put him on the phone.

The ensuing pause was so long I thought I'd lost Bath. But finally he said, "Bo should have been able to tell you everything there was on that."

I said I needed a second confirmation on some information, particularly about Scott Barnes.

"He's a flake. I won't go any further than to say the guy's crazier than a mutha fucker."

"Was he a problem on the operation?" I asked.

"No, not so much. He was cooperative, though we had a little dissension - he and one of the other members," Bath said.

"Are you the one who pulled Mac back after he hit Barnes?" I asked.

Bath answered, "I just told them they had to knock that shit off because we hadn't completed the mission. I wasn't in charge, but I was sort of the tie breaker when everyone got in an argument."

"Was that in Laos?"

"We didn't go into Laos, just Thailand," Bath answered.

"Did any members go into Laos?" I asked.

"No."

"When did you come back?"

"I don't remember the exact date, we were moving around so much. The first part of November, approximately."

"Why didn't you go into Laos?"

"Because we didn't have any intention to in the first place. On top of that, it would have been suicidal. The Vietnamese are using Laos as an avenue to carry supplies and ammunition and troops down into Cambodia. So to be sure nobody comes out their back side they have about three heavy Laotian divisions right along the Mekong River between Laos and Thailand. Plus they have air cover."

"Did Gritz stay in the states for the operation?" I asked.

"Yea."

"And Barnes, was he much assistance?"

"He was at first. He and I were originally together, just breaking ground over there. But he wasn't really as well versed in the area as he had claimed to be. Once we got there I found that out."

"Would you describe the operation as a success?"

"To be real truthful about it, I'm not supposed to say anything because it went to, ah... that's all I can tell you."

"Did you find evidence of POW's?"

"We thought there were several people in a particular location, but there was nothing we could pin down."

I asked Bath if he had spent time with Barnes and Gritz

at the "safe house" in Playa del Rey.

"Yea, we were all there for five or six days. No more than that," Bath said.

"How do you feel about the use being made of the information you brought back?" I asked.

"Well, I don't know. The Delta (a group of elite Green Berets) runs in tight circles. They really don't put out to the press everything they're doing."

"Did you also have business cards from Congressman Dornan's office?" I asked.

"Where did you get information like that?" Bath responded.

"I've been interviewing Bo and Scott," I said.

"Well, those things were made up for us. They were a piece of crap. We got rid of them"

"Did you get the cards from Bo?"

"Yes, I believe we did."

"Barnes is saying you guys were to go into Laos and liquidate any Caucasians you found. Are you familiar with that story?"

"I heard faintly about that. I never did get the full skinny on it. But Scott Barnes, I'll tell you up front, is a flake, a habitual liar. The guy tells some of the most far fetched garbage I ever heard."

"Did Bo originally contact you about the operation?"

"No, but he was involved with the people who originally contacted me."

"Do you also work through Hughes?"

"I'm gainfully unemployed."

"Do you still have Hughes radio equipment?"

"No, I sent it back."

"What's your response to Scott's insistence that you guys went across into Laos?"

"That's an absolute lie, and I'll take a polygraph test on that. I can account for everyday that we were there. Scott did want to go across, but there was no way in hell we was gonna cross."

"Can you verify that you were using DOB telexes? (to communicate stateside)"

"Yea, ah..."

"And this was a CIA program?"

"It was not. It was a private sector program, to my knowledge."

The conversation ended with our exchanging reports on the California and Florida weather conditions.

But shortly after hanging up I recalled Barnes had shown me a picture he said was of himself and Bath on the bank of the Mekong River, which divides Thailand and Laos. If the picture was taken there, it places Barnes, if not in Laos, at least on its border.

I called Bath back, and after apologizing for interrupting his Easter weekend again, asked where the Bohica team had spent most of its time.

"It's kind of hard to pronounce - Nakhon Phanom. We just called it NKP," Bath said.

"That's on the Mekong River?"

"Yes," he answered.

"I also wanted to ask about the dog tag you and Scott were given. Did you find out who it belonged to?"

Bath answered, "No, Scott got it on the initial contact, and I sent the information back on it. But the name wasn't being carried on the POW MIA list, or anything else."

"Did you see the letter written in Laotian with your and

Scott's names in it?" I asked.

"Oh yea. I believe that was a letter Scott was going to deliver to Vang Pao."

After this second conversation with Bath, Barnes suggested we visit the "safe house" in Playa del Rey, which he described to me as we drove. "Vic has a blue Mercedes," Barnes said. There was a blue Mercedes in the driveway when we reached Vic's address.

Barnes parked around the corner. As I walked toward the house I encountered a tall, trim, well-built man on the sidewalk.

He acknowledged he was Vic and I introduced myself.

Then I asked if he had a few minutes to talk about "Operation Bohica."

He looked very coldly at me for several seconds before finally asking, "Where did you get this address?"

I said I had interviewed Bo Gritz that morning.

"I'm going to call Bo," he said. With some relief I recalled Gritz said he would be out for the day. Vic went to a phone in his garage and made the call. He left a message on Gritz's answer phone.

"I can't talk to you until I talk to Bo," Vic said. He took my number but never called me.

The rest of the weekend was spent trying to reach some of the other people Barnes insisted could further help to verify his story. The list included ABC's Ted Koppel, a reporter in Jack Anderson's office, General Vang Pao, a girlfriend who had accompanied Barnes on a visit to Vang Pao shortly after Barnes's return, and Dornan's former aide, Stan Mullin.

Mullin was the only one I was able to reach. He returned my call Easter Sunday evening.

I asked him if Barnes, Gritz and Vang Pao had ever met together in Dornan's office.

"Yes," he said. "Barnes had called and asked if our office could be used as a meeting place for Gritz and Vang Pao. Two other Asians were with Vang Pao as well."

"Most of the meeting was devoted to discussions about 'yellow rain' in the area and about the possibility of photographing POW's imprisoned there," Mullin said.

"Whose idea was it to use Dornan's business cards?" I asked.

"I actually have no idea. We (Dornan's office) were not told about it. Scott asked for a card of mine when I first met him to verify I was who I said I was. That was the only card I gave out. The next thing I knew Scott returned from Asia and he showed me a duplicate of mine with his name on it."

"Did Congressman Dornan participate in any meetings with Gritz, Barnes and Vang Pao?" I asked.

Mullin answered, "No. The only meeting I know of between the congressman and Gritz was probably a couple of weeks following the meeting you're referring to. It was a spontaneous meeting. Gritz came by on a Sunday and happened to catch the congressman in. I think they met on one other occasion also."

"Do you recall sending Scott a page out of the congressman's guest book?" I asked.

"Yes, there were a couple pages in a normal, standard guest book. Scott had mentioned he was concerned about Vang Pao signing in, so I think he called me after the fact, and being sensitive to whatever needs he may have had, I pulled the page out and sent it to him. I didn't particularly understand, but I felt it didn't make any difference to us,"

Mullin said.

I started off Monday morning with a call to Ron Soble at the *Los Angeles Times*. As Gritz had suggested, I asked Soble his views on Barnes' credibility.

Soble answered, "I don't know anything about Barnes. I worked just a few hours on a story relating to him, but was never able to reach him. Isn't Barnes the one who's supposed to be saying bad things about Gritz? Gritz should be able to tell you about Barnes."

Recalling that Gritz had said the defense attorneys for the Hell's Angels would confirm Barnes was a phony, I called Jack Palladino. Palladino was a principal attorney for the Hell's Angels in their two-and-one-half year, \$15 million trial on racketeering charges in California. The trial ended in a hung jury.

Said Palladino, "Barnes was an undercover police officer with BET (Biker Enforcement Team), a State Attorney General's Office operation. He's the kind of guy who gets fervent, and may work 80 hours a week, but is difficult to control. He volunteered to testify for the defense and did so in January, 1981. We tried to use his testimony to show the police were waging a vendetta against the Hell's Angels, that they had attempted to set up Sonny Barger (leader of the Hell's Angels). But most of Barnes's testimony was blocked. The judge ruled it was too broad ranging, too far afield. We did check Barnes out, and he was who he said he was."

Monday I also talked to the girl Barnes said he had taken to meet General Vang Pao. She recalled that the meeting took place on the afternoon of Friday, November 6 (a few days after Barnes claims to have returned from Thailand).

And I talked to General Vang Pao, who chuckled at my questions, but volunteered nothing. "I don't have to talk about this thing," was the only complete sentence I got out of him.

Spencer Davis, spokesperson for the Senate Intelligence Committee, confirmed that Barnes's allegations were being looked into, but said they are "hard to swallow."

Central Intelligence Agency spokesperson Dale Peterson, in response to questions about Barnes, said, "We have never ordered Mr. Barnes to kill anyone. As a matter of fact, we've never had any relationship with Mr. Barnes."

In regards to Gritz, Peterson said, "No, we have not had any activities in relationship to him either."

"Ever?" I asked.

"That is correct," he said.

ABC *Nightline*'s producer Stew Schwartz, when asked for a copy of Barnes's polygraph report, refused to release it. But Lucette Lagnado, the reporter in Jack Anderson's office working on the Barnes story, said she saw the report.

Among the questions Barnes was asked, she said, were "Did you go into Laos?" and "Were you ordered to assassinate American prisoners of war?"

According to Lagnado, Barnes answered yes to both questions, and the test showed he was telling the truth.

The mind recoils at believing 28-year-old Scott Barnes passed a lie detector test administered by the foremost polygrapher in the world because Barnes was, in fact, ordered to assassinate two American POW's.

Yet, to think he passed the lie detector test, developed as much convincing evidence as he did, ensnared a Congressman and several experienced intelligence officers, all while not telling the truth may be even more frightening. ●

Mystery in Bangkok: **Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead**

By Ellen Ray

The mysterious death of a U.S. government official attached to the State Department's refugee program in Thailand, who was also a known disbeliever of the U.S. chemical warfare propaganda, has added a new dimension to growing evidence of yellow rain fabrication --and worse by the CIA.

Jerrold Barker Daniels, 40, of Missoula, Montana, died April 29, 1982 in his Bangkok apartment, allegedly from carbon monoxide poisoning. Journalists in Bangkok said that Daniels had been keeping copious records about "something secret," but that all his private papers were missing when authorities said they found his body some two days after he died. A Thai university student was found unconscious in his apartment; the mother of the student apparently informed the police that her son was missing, and they learned that he was last seen with Daniels. Now

recovered from a coma, the student told a U.S. journalist that he does not remember what happened.


Information remains scant in what has become a major scandal, stretching from the remote Lao refugee camps of northern Thailand to an equally remote ranch in western Montana where the titular head of the Hmong tribespeople General Vang Pao--resides. But according to CAIB's sources, the FBI's counter-intelligence office in Washington is investigating Daniels's death.

The Strange Death of Jerry Daniels

The U.S. Embassy initially released the unlikely story that Daniels died from a leaking gas stove. Some Embassy officials even claimed, off the record, that they had "fooled around" with the pilot on Daniels's stove while drunk at a party there a few nights before. The Embassy then clamped



Department of State Newsletter (June 1979) photograph of Jerry Daniels (second from right) at Nong Khai refugee center.



A rare photo of Long Cheng, Laos, CIA command post during the war.

down and refused any further statements. However, enough information was leaked to the *Bangkok Post* to make it appear there was a homosexual incident involved, limiting further inquiry.

In Washington, meanwhile, Henry B. Cushing, Director of the AID Office of Refugee Processing and Admissions, attributed Daniels's death equally improbably to carbon monoxide escaping from a hot water heater. In addition, Cushing confirmed what other sources told *CAIB*—that Daniels had worked for the CIA in support operations for Vang Pao in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But “he had no intelligence function” in Thailand, Cushing cautioned.

The Role of Vang Pao

When the CIA-Hmong nerve center in Long Cheng, Laos was overrun by communist forces in 1975, Vang Pao made his way to Daniels's home state of Montana, via Bangkok and West Germany. In Montana he paid cash for homes, ranches, and cars for his extended family, and dug in to continue directing his people in the CIA's secret war, now exposed. [See sidebar.]

Jerry Daniels's relationship with Vang Pao was well known. To some he appeared like a son to the General; to others, however, the relationship seemed more business-

General Vang Pao

General Vang Pao, the 53-year-old Hmong hill tribe chieftain, owes his fortunes to long service with the colonial invaders of his native country, Laos. The General's military career began at age 13 as a jungle messenger for French intelligence during World War II. He fought closely at the side of the French at Dienbienphu in 1954, but escaped capture by the Vietnamese victors by marching his Hmong troops into the mountains.

In 1959-60, the so-called *Armee Clandestine* (Secret Army) was founded with CIA sponsorship. As Martin Goldstein wrote in his study, *American Policy Towards Laos*, the *Armee Clandestine* was “armed, equipped, fed, paid, guided strategically and tactically, and often transported into and out of battle by the CIA.”

Long Cheng, in north central Laos, was the base of operations for Vang Pao and the CIA. Virtually uninhabited before 1962, it grew in direct proportion to the CIA's secret war, and in profitability to the expanding

opium trade in the Golden Triangle. By 1969 some 30,000 Hmong lived there, making it the second largest city in Laos. Of the 100 to 150 tons annual opium production in Laos, more than 75% was produced by the Hmong, some of that at Long Cheng in partnership with the CIA.

When Long Cheng was overrun in 1975, Vang Pao moved his family to Missoula, Montana, where he laid out almost \$200,000 in cash for property including a 400-acre farm which, he said, “looks just like my country, the Plain of Jars.”

Vang Pao, however, is no longer undisputed leader of the Hmong exiles in the U.S. (Their numbers are closely guarded by the State Department, but well exceed 30,000.) And though Vang Pao spends at least half his time in Orange County in southern California at what is described as a mercenary training camp for Lao resistance fighters, many Hmong are not willing to sacrifice more at the order of Vang Pao. They have lost too much already.



like. In 1979 American Mennonite missionaries John and Beulah Yoder visited the reception center for Lao refugees in Nong Khai, Thailand. As they picked their way through the different groups of refugees, some exhausted and wounded from raids against Lao government positions, John Yoder was approached by a young English-speaking Hmong who asked him if he knew "Jerry Hall." Yoder asked who Hall was and the Hmong explained that he had worked with Hall at Long Cheng during the war. Afterwards, and until just recently, the Hmong refugee had been fighting in the Phu Bia area of Laos, a former CIA-Hmong stronghold. Now he expected to meet Hall in Thailand.

"The Hmong people do what he says," he told Yoder. "He brings us messages from the 'big man.'" When Yoder

asked who the "big man" was, the refugee answered, "Mr. Vang Pao. When the 'big man' speaks, the Hmong listen. He will tell us if we should return to Laos and fight or if we should remain here and try to go to America." On returning to Vientiane, John Yoder asked the Charge d'Affairs at the U.S. Embassy there, George Roberts, who Jerry Hall was; he was told, "Jerrold Barker Daniels."

It was not long after this incident that Jerry Daniels confided to a BBC reporter that he did not believe the U.S.-Hmong allegations about yellow rain. Coming from



Vang Pao (center) with CIA advisor, George Bacon (left). Bacon was later killed in Angola carrying out mercenary activities.



General Vang Pao, the CIA's man in the secret war, on his Montana ranch.

Credit: Harley Hettick

someone with Daniels's close connections with the Hmong, and his intelligence background, the reporter was understandably surprised.

The Yellow Rain Propaganda

Bangkok, with Hong Kong a close second, is the center of the yellow rain propaganda war. The *Bangkok Post* and the more prestigious *Far Eastern Economic Review* virtually parrot the U.S. charges, with little attempt to verify them. At least one of the reporters who writes often on the subject, and is picked up in the West, was formerly with Forum World Features and World Features Service [see *CAIB* Numbers 7, 10, and 12].

Given his special position with the refugees, Daniels must have interviewed Touy Manikham, the Lao pilot who defected, alleging that he had fired rockets loaded with gas on Hraong hill-tribe villages between 1977 and late 1978. Few believe the Manikham story, filled as it is with inconsistencies, not the least of which is that Manikham was American-trained, and flew five years of combat against the communist forces in Laos from the U.S. base at Udorn, Thailand. By war's end he was flying missions from Vang Pao's camp at Long Cheng, defending the very Hmong guerrillas he recently claimed to have attacked with yellow rain on orders from the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese.

Jerry Daniels knew, if anyone did, the true story behind the dramatic media coup by Dr. Amos Townsend, who led

a three person ABC-TV crew by elephant through the jungle for six hours into Kampuchea to interview Khmer Rouge soldiers, alleged victims of a chemical attack by the Vietnamese. Dr. Townsend personally brought the yellow rain samples out of Kampuchea and carried them to Bangkok, whence they were rushed to Washington and slipped into the laboratory of Professor Mirocha. [See *Part I: Yellow Rain*, in this issue.]

Jerry Daniels must have known Townsend well; the doctor worked for the International Rescue Committee with all its intelligence connections [see *CAIB* Number 12], as medical director of the Nong Khai refugee camp until late 1980. Then, Townsend said, he was "approached by two American investigators" to give his assistance in investigating the poison gas reports. "Released" by IRC for full time investigating, Townsend told the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that he feels particularly "sensitive" about yellow rain because during the Korean War he worked on biological warfare at Fort Detrick. Could some of Daniels's missing notes involve Townsend?

Finally, Daniels's death coincided with a *Bangkok Post* story claiming that Lao resistance forces had captured a rocket and warhead bearing Soviet markings and believed to be armed with mycotoxin chemicals. The U.S., according to *Asia Week*, waited breathlessly for the "final, indisputable evidence they have sought so long," the smoking gun. Curiously, the Lao troops who "found" the rocket grenade took it to the Austrian Embassy in Bangkok, rather than to the U.S. Embassy. Were they afraid that Daniels might not buy their story? As it turned out later, no one did, but this was just hours before Daniels died.

Unanswered Questions

On the evening of May 8, ten days after he died, the body of Jerrold Barker Daniels arrived at the Missoula airport from Bangkok via New York, a strange route. The metal-lined coffin, screwed shut, varnished over and sealed, was accompanied by U.S. State Department and Thai government officials. For two days of Hmong ceremonial rituals, U.S. bodyguards watched over the sealed coffin night and day. And when the final interment ceremony commenced, with nine Hmong pallbearers, the "big man" was there to pay his last respects.

There are some postscripts to the Daniels affair. A young mortuary worker claims the State Department paid for the funeral in cash, but his boss denies it. He says that the body was putrified, suggesting a wound, but of course the coffin remained nailed shut. The *Bangkok Post* announcement was careful to mention that Daniels's body had no wounds. There are rumors in Bangkok that his hands had been bound, that there were rope burns on the wrists. Moreover, there are rumors that there have been at least two other strange deaths of U.S. Embassy personnel in Bangkok in the last year.

Daniels's mother told a Cleveland reporter that as far as she knew her son's job was to interview Hmong refugees to see if they qualified to immigrate to the U.S. The criteria, she said, were strict; they had to have served with Uncle Sam during the secret war. Vang Pao also seems to be losing influence with some of these Hmong, who are challenging his leadership. Perhaps he has given too much of his people, and got too little in return. Perhaps Jerry Daniels had come to that opinion too.



R. Neveu/Gamma

Former Colonel Dr. Amos Townsend, the mycotoxin mogul.

Publications of Interest

- Hinckle, Warren and William Turner, "The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro," Harper & Row, New York, \$15.50. Finally an account of the ongoing, neverending U.S. war against the Cuban revolution which is not only comprehensive but also briskly readable. Hinckle and Turner spent years researching this book, which contains accounts of innumerable interviews with supporters and opponents of the Cuban government, and describes the escapades of the CIA and the Cuban exiles and the Mafia in detail never before published.
- Herman, Edward S., "The Real Terror Network," South End Press, Boston, \$7.50. This is the book everyone said had to be written in response to Claire Sterling, Arnaud de Borchgrave, and the other ideologues of the right who insist that terrorism is a left-wing phenomenon. Herman, the co-author with Noam Chomsky of "The Political Economy of Human Rights," has prepared a well-documented response which demonstrates the pervasive role of the national security state, of state terrorism, as practiced by so many of America's allies. Facts, figures, and charts all help solidify Herman's compelling argument.
- *Our Right to Know*, the bi-monthly newsletter of the Fund for Open Information and Accountability, Inc. Covers all aspects of the struggle for freedom of information, including updates on FOIA in the news and FOIA in the courts. \$10/year from FOIA, Inc., 339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012.
- Armstrong, Robert and Janet Shenk, "El Salvador: The Face of the Revolution," South End Press, Boston, \$7.50. A comprehensive analysis of political developments in El Salvador over the last decade by two experienced reporters from NACLA's *Report on the Americas*. Also contains very helpful maps, charts and glossaries.
- Arkin, William M., "Research Guide to Current Military and Strategic Affairs," IPS Books, Washington, \$7.95. An invaluable guide to nearly every journal, periodical, and governmental publication, world-wide, dealing with military and strategic affairs, interpreted broadly. Hundreds and hundreds of helpful pieces of information for any journalist or other researcher in this field.
- Rips, Geoffrey, "Unamerican Activities: The Campaign Against the Underground Press," City Lights Books, San Francisco, \$7.95. An analysis of the FBI's campaign against the underground press of the 1960s and 1970s, with much documentation uncovered through Freedom of Information Act requests. Rips's comprehensive article is preceded by short pieces from Todd Gitlin and Allen Ginsberg.
- *Raw Materials Report*, a quarterly magazine on the political economy of natural resources, published by the Raw Materials Group in Sweden. Provides basic information on raw materials analyzed within a political framework focusing on: the world struggle for raw materials; alternatives to the present exploitation by transnationals; and support for third world liberation struggles. From: Raw Materials Report, P.O. Box 5195, 104 44 Stockholm, Sweden: individuals, 150 Swedish crowns or equivalent in U.S. dollars; institutions, 380 crowns or equivalent.
- *Brek Loose*, the official newsletter of the Movement for National Liberation (MONALI) of Barbados. A monthly newsletter with information on the progressive struggles of the Eastern Caribbean. From: MONALI, 2nd Ave. Promenade Road, Bank Hall, St. Michael, Barbados; \$8 (Barbados) or \$4 U.S./year.
- *Nicaraguan Perspectives*, a quarterly journal with excellent articles analyzing issues of relevance to Nicaragua and broader Latin American issues. An excellent blend of scholarly articles and current journalism. From: Nicaragua Information Center, P.O. Box 1004, Berkeley, CA 94704; \$10/year.
- *Soberania*, the journal of the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Central America and the Caribbean, noted in the last issue of *CAIB*, has become bi-lingual, with articles in Spanish and English. Filled with exposures of CIA actions and personnel in the region, *Soberania* has announced that because of the impending Intelligence Identities Protection Act and its strictures against U.S. publications it will "hence forward publish a fixed section in which we will print the names of the interventionist and terrorist elements that the Central Intelligence Agency cloaks under its veil of secrecy." From: T.A.C.C., Apartado 49, Managua, Nicaragua; U.S., \$25/year; Europe, \$30, year; Africa & Asia, \$35/year.
- *LAWG Letter*, the bi-monthly journal of the Latin American Working Group of Canada. In depth analyses of Latin American issues, often with a single theme to an issue. From: Latin American Working Group, Box 2207, Station P, Toronto, ON, Canada M5S 2T2; Individuals, \$10; institutions, \$17; air mail, add \$5.
- *The Dossier*, "the official journal of the International Spy Society." Devoted to spy gadgetry and espionage fiction and film as well as the real thing, this is an interesting but rather conservative publication. While they have the good sense to pan Robert Moss's latest novel ("numbing . . . seemingly endless"), they attack Philip Agee, and, most disconcertingly, think that the Executive Order on U.S. Intelligence Activities represents a backing down by the Reagan administration and an upholding of the legal protections of American citizens. From: Richard L. Knudson, Department of English, State University of New York, Oneonta, NY 13820; \$12/year.
- *TransNational Brief*, the monthly journal of the TransNational Co-operative Ltd., a group of 22 Australian unions and hundreds of labor activists. Very progressive labor publication with information sometimes of great interest to *CAIB* readers. From: TransNational Co-operative, Ltd., G.P.O. Box 161, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia; \$46 (U.S.) year, U.S.; \$48 (U.S.) year, Europe.
- *People's Power*, the quarterly journal of the Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre (MAGIC). Informative articles on southern Africa, with official speeches and interviews when available, as well as news notes. From: MAGIC, 34 Percy Street, London W1P 9FG, U.K.; \$15 year, air; \$12 year surface.
- *Bulletin Info-Turk*, monthly newsletter of Turkish resistance groups, from Belgium. Provides information hard to find elsewhere. From: Collectif Turc, Square Ch. M. Wiser 13 2, 1040 Brussels, Belgium; 400 BF year.

News Notes

Executive Mercenaries

"You'll see more and more high level 'mercenaries' being assigned to unstable areas using the cover of retirement, defection, or whatever—it's an active part of the Reagan team's strategic foreign policy and an ongoing operational part of the Company's tactical plans."

So says Ed Charles, one of the many retired CIA employees cited in a feature article in *Gung Ho* (June 1982), which describes itself as "the magazine for the international military man." Entitled "High-stakes Mercenaries," the piece examines the lucrative second careers of some of the intelligence complex's former power elite. Examples range from Eleazer A. Williams, a former CIA chief of station in Saigon and Singapore now heading a firm which provides "security consulting for business and government," to Theodore Shackley, formerly number two man in the CIA's clandestine services directorate and now a consultant to international brokerage firms doing business in world trouble spots. Even relatively low-level operatives like Mike Ackerman, an 11-year veteran of CIA covert action in Latin America and Europe, have ventured into the burgeoning field. Ackerman joined fellow ex-CIA man Louis Palombo and 20 other former CIA people to open a Miami-based "pacification and stabilization business." As J. David Truby, author of the *Gung Ho* article, notes of Ackerman, "his firm, and others like it, enable the CIA to enforce U.S. policy and its own operational directives without having to involve the government officially... the Agency maintains that all important deniability." [J. David Truby is presumably a pseudonym since *Gung Ho*

stated in its premier issue that "most of our writers are still doing what they write about" and thus usually write under names other than their own.]

Ed Charles, a Special forces vet proud to have been among the first 50 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam before joining the CIA, from which he too is now retired, says that the Wilson/Terpil Libyan "hit squads" saga [see *CAIB* Number 16] is a recent example of how deniability works; "the Company puts out the cover story that the guys are renegades." Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty, a former CIA-Pentagon liaison officer who worked in the Caribbean and Middle East before retirement, seemingly agrees with Charles's assessment; "Let's be realistic, you can't operate at that plateau, in that area, with those tonnages and with that level of sophisticated equipment without official U.S. sanction. Senator Lloyd Bentsen [Rep.-Texas], cited in the same article, claims that it is the \$2.5 billion annual trade in U.S. weaponry which lures former CIA officials to utilize their contacts and expertise in a second career, but as Col. Prouty states, "You have to have that 'license' issued in Washington by way of Langley to be a mercenary... All of them, every single one has the U.S. government sponsorship or they would be working... If Uncle Sam doesn't want you to go soldiering on your own somewhere, you'll never get there... or back, one way or the other. Either the Customs, FBI or CIA will stop you. Or, someone over there will get you with Uncle's blessing."

If it's improbable for a single mercenary to operate as a truly independent agent, the complex logistical arrangements needed to stage even a small coordinated mercenary attempt would seem to make ludicrous extensive denials of support from an organized source. The author of *Gung Ho*'s article seems to agree:



"You'll note that even a rather modest mere operation will cost two to four million dollars a month to sustain. When you're head hunting for an executive level mercenary to put this whole act together you can add about \$10,000 per month to your expense account, or so the experienced executives tell me. But, who is actually paying the bill?"

"With the exception of the international oil cartels and two or three other multinational conglomerates, today's mercenary operations are not organized and funded by private companies . . . On our side of the ocean all ongoing mere operations are planned, organized, staffed and funded largely by the U.S. government.

Don't believe their pious denials of such involvement; it's bullshit."

Remember, this time they said it, not us.

Another Link With Academia

Regents of the University of California at San Diego (UCSD) unanimously approved the appointment of Dr. Richard Attiyeh to be Dean of the Office of Graduate Studies and Research in spite of widespread opposition within the University community, according to the *new indicator*, a student newspaper distributed in the San Diego area. A professor of economics, Attiyeh began work in 1975 on a CIA contract through an off-campus front organization, the Institute for Policy Analysis (IPA). Dr. Attiyeh is one of the corporation's four board members; additionally he remains as the president, a post he has held since IPA was incorporated in 1972. Although Attiyeh has stated several times that the corporation is inactive, the California Secretary of State's office informed the *new indicator* that IPA is an active corporation in good standing.

IPA's contract with the CIA brought in approximately \$100-150,000, a rather paltry sum given the scope of its research on the world flow of critical resources. The April 27 issue of the *new indicator* noted that this kind of research was directly responsible for the successful coordination of economic boycotts, price manipulations, and trade wars against the popularly-elected government of Salvador Allende.

Apparently, Dr. Attiyeh is not anxious to be put on the defensive about his CIA participation since the application he submitted for the position as Dean neglected to mention any CIA ties. The resume which Attiyeh has on file with the campus Public Information Office, however (updated in 1981), lists his presidency with IPA as "present position." Why would Attiyeh hesitate to disclose contractual research capable, in his words, of "increasing research activities in the department?"

Perhaps this is because the Dean of the Office of Graduate Studies and Research is particularly susceptible to CIA influence. Duties of the Dean include oversight of UCSD research dollars, compliance with University regulations prohibiting classified research, and allocation of state funds to support faculty research. It is also this office which responds to requests for information by government agencies, such as one recent FBI request for information regarding the subjects studied by foreign students on the UCSD campus.

The CIA's Five Year Plan

The CIA is one of the few federal agencies currently recruiting new employees. According to the *Wall Street Journal* of March 5, 1982, the Reagan administration plans to bolster the capacity of the U.S. intelligence system by hiring more analysts and has been utilizing commercial radio time to attract more clandestine agents, shifting the focus from technological resource development. According to a senior intelligence official anonymously quoted in the same article, "the largest single increment is going to have to come in processing and analysis."

While the administration intends to maintain the unparalleled spy technology of the United States intelligence system, it recognizes that only people can assess policy implications underlying electronically observed data, and so has begun strengthening the system's human collection potential overseas.

The aim of the strengthened intelligence system is to augment further the CIA's capability to conduct covert operations. The public is not supposed to be alarmed though; the President has reconstituted the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of outsiders who advise on intelligence work. The *Journal* notes that the Board is weighted with conservative Republicans, and includes Reagan's friend Alfred S. Bloomingdale, former head of Diner's Club. Richard Allen, formerly Reagan's national security advisory, has been hired as a part time consultant to the Board.

How will all this be financed, in the midst of federal budget deficits? Quite simply, the administration has quietly begun increasing the intelligence complex's secret budget at approximately the same 18 percent rate at which the Pentagon's will increase in FY 1983.

Particularly insidious has been the special attention devoted to attracting Americans of Third World ancestry to intelligence work. Special pamphlets are oriented toward "minorities" in technical fields, stressing the opportunity to travel and the unique challenge offered mere college graduates. This type of advertising can be found on campuses with historically Black student bodies, and full page ads for the CIA, DIA, and NSA have been prominent in the annual career issues of the *Black Collegian* for at least the last three years.



(continued from page 52)

charge of attempting to extort \$50,000 from Somoza in exchange for the details of a plot to overthrow him, so he may not have been the most credible witness, even though his connection to the Agency is well established.

What makes John Banks's story doubtful isn't whether the CIA would actually do such a thing. Rather, it is that more credible reports, including a *New York Times* article by Philip Taubman last December, say that U.S. hit teams were working to bolster Somoza's dictatorship right up to the bitter end. According to Taubman, a group of four former Green Berets and Navy unconventional warfare specialists, recruited in Fayetteville, North Carolina, went to Nicaragua to infiltrate the Sandinista movement and to sabotage it. "The men also told their friends that they had selected for assassination a senior official in Cuban intelligence who was working in Nicaragua and a Mexican businessman supporting opponents of Somoza." The four were killed in a plane crash in late 1978.

Other accounts from last summer more credible than the testimony of John Banks include a report of suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of Panamanian President Omar Torrijos. Panama's *Critica* and Santo Domingo's *El Nuevo Diario* said there were indications of foul play associated with the crash of Torrijos's airplane. A number of *campesinos* in the region of Coclesito said they heard two explosions, one before the plane crashed into Juan Julio mountain. The flight captain's last communication with the Chiriqui control tower announced his plan to descend, conflicting with earlier reports that he had been flying below the altitudes of the highest mountains in the area. The weather between Chiriqui and Coclesito was not stormy as had been reported. Finally, said the papers, Torrijos had just two months earlier expelled from Panama the Summer Institute of Linguistics, accusing it of being a CIA instrument; the same institute had been kicked out of Ecuador just a few weeks before the "accident" in which President Jaime Roldos lost his life in a similar airplane crash. A military source pointed out that "a surface-to-air rocket is easily fired from the jungle." Two months before Torrijos died, a bomb had been discovered on his plane.

If that story failed to get consideration from the U.S. press, the same cannot be said of the CIA plot, first reported in *Newsweek*, to assassinate Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Though there were the usual denials all around, it is clear that even members of Congress are convinced that is what CIA Director William Casey had in mind. Meanwhile, with Libya in the news all that time, Jack Anderson took the opportunity to recycle the allegation that Qaddafi's CIA friend, Frank Terpil, had assassinated Bruce McKenzie, a white Kenyan official, during his visit to Uganda while Terpil was stationed there.

Another story that made headlines about that time concerned the mysterious death of Dennis McNell, a figure in the securities scandal that forced the resignation of Max Hugel, at the time the head of the CIA's clandestine department. Suspicions were so strong McNell had met with foul play that a judge ordered his body exhumed and autopsied.

The most recent disclosure of a CIA assassination is found in the May 1982 issue of *Gung Ho*, a mercenary

magazine. An article titled "The CIA's Man for all Nations" is a biography of Helmut Streicher, one of Adolf Hitler's intelligence officers who went to work for the U.S. at war's end and was a top CIA operative until his retirement in 1980. In the adulatory story by William Seymour, Streicher described how the CIA "handled" a double agent named Geyer after he crossed into the Eastern Zone with microfilmed secrets in 1957:

"Two of our people went into East Berlin (at that time there was an open border between the sectors) and staked him out at his building. When Geyer came out at noon, one agent created a noisy car wreck down the street by driving through a shop window. While pedestrians were looking at this, our other man leaned a silencer-equipped rifle out of a rented room across the way and put Geyer out of business permanently."

Silencer equipped weapons are not used for military purposes: they are assassination weapons used the way Streicher says. So the strongest evidence that the U.S. government is still engaged in assassinations is the procurement of these devices. On May 6, 1981, the following notice appeared in *Commerce Business Daily*, the publication through which the government notifies manufacturers to submit bids for goods and services:

"1-YEAR 9 MM SILENCER DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. Sources must have analytical and experimental research experience in the development of Small Arms and Silencers. Sources must be completely familiar with the gas dynamics associated with Small Arms noise attenuation devices. Also, sources must have experience in the production of Small Arms and/or Silencers at high production rates and the associated production engineering capability. Additionally, sources must have sufficient qualified personnel and facilities to properly design, develop, fabricate and test the Silencer concept."

The ad went on to say that after the respondents have been screened, a solicitation will be issued to those prospects "who, in the sole judgment of the purchasing activity, have the potential of successfully fulfilling the requirements of the planned contract." In other words, the contract would be (or has been) let secretly, without further public notice.

The CIA's assassins are still in business.

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Number 17 (Summer 1982)

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Sources and Methods:

CIA Assassinations: Part 3*

By Ken Lawrence

The largest CIA assassination operation ever undertaken was the Phoenix Program in Vietnam directed by William Colby, who went on to become Director of Central Intelligence, and Robert Komer, who went on to become Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Few Phoenix agents have told their stories in public; many have undoubtedly continued in the same line of work, either for the CIA or as mercenaries hired by others. One who regretted his past was Timothy Dunn, who told of his experiences in an interview with Murv Glass for the newspaper *Common Ground* published at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in the January 18-22, 1979 issue.

Among the more explosive of Dunn's disclosures was that he and his squad were sometimes ordered to kill U.S. military personnel who were regarded as security risks:

"Glass: Did orders for this come from the same place as for the other hits?

"Dunn: Yeah. It came more reluctantly, though. Even though it was passed along. You kind of had the feeling it came from someplace else other than Division. Because in the military organization, Division was God. Everything happened from Division.

"Glass: And these officers were part of Division, right?

"Dunn: Yeah, but the orders came from a source that

superseded that Office of Naval Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency or agencies such as this. You more or less knew by the briefing you got where the orders were coming from."

Dunn said he personally killed about 30 people, ten with a knife. And in addition to killing to terrorize the Vietnamese population, Phoenix agents also went on "body snatching" missions. "It was actually to kidnap someone, to bring them back to camp and interrogate them."

Unfortunately the Timothy Dunn interview was published long after Congress had lost its will to press forward with a full investigation of CIA involvement in assassinations.

Since our last column on this topic, several more allegations have surfaced concerning CIA assassination plots, notwithstanding a clause in Ford's, Carter's, and Reagan's executive orders on intelligence that appears to bar such activity.

John Banks, who fought for the CIA as a mercenary in Angola, testified in London last year that he had been offered a job by another CIA contract agent, Frank Sturgis (of Watergate fame), to assassinate the former Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza, whose rule had become a liability to the U.S. Banks was defending himself against a

*Part 1 appeared in *CA* Number 8 (March-April 1980); Part 2 appeared in Number 11 (December 1980).

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